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Two conflicting stories have consumed the academic debate regard-
ing the impact of deinstitutionalization litigation. The first, which has
risen almost to the level of conventional wisdom, is that deinstitutionali-
zation was a disaster. The second story challenges the suggestion that
deinstitutionalization has uniformly been unsuccessful, as well as the
causal link critics seek to draw with the growth of the homeless popula-
tion. This Article, which embraces the second story, assesses the current
wave of deinstitutionalization litigation. It contends that things will be
different this time. The particular outcomes of the first wave of deinstitu-
tionalization litigation, this Article contends, resulted from the
interaction between the political dynamics surrounding that litigation
and the legal claims asserted by deinstitutionalization advocates. But both
those dynamics and those legal claims have changed significantly.
Precisely because the first wave of deinstitutionalization litigation was so
successful in moving residents out of large state institutions, the efforts of
deinstitutionalization advocates have turned to ensuring the availability
of adequate services in the community. This has shifted the fiscal politics
of the field in ways that destabilize old political alliances but create the
potential for new ones. At the same time, deinstitutionalization advocates
have moved from the due process theories on which they relied in the
1970s and 1980s to an anti-discrimination theory relying on the ADA.
That theory imposes a powerful incentive on states to create and fund
adequate community services.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to participants in the
University of Michigan Law School Governance Lunch, the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Law
and Society Association, and a faculty workshop at the Case Western Reserve Law School, as
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INTRODUCTION
Two conflicting stories have consumed the academic debate re-
garding the impact of deinstitutionalization litigation. The first, which
has risen almost to the level of conventional wisdom, is that deinstitu-
tionalization was a "disaster."' A leading critic, Dr. E. Fuller Torrey,
described its results as "a psychiatric Titanic"2-an evocative phrase
quoted with approval by two Supreme Court justices3-and as "one of
the great social disasters of recent American history."4 Another leading
critic, Professor Paul Appelbaum, called deinstitutionalization a
"tragedy."5 Professor Amitai Etzioni, who actually expressed cautious
support for deinstitutionalization, nonetheless referred to it as a
1 CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 39 (1994). These academics consider deinstitu-
tionalization a "disaster" at the very least for people with psychiatric disabilities. However,
deinstitutionalization of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities receives much
less criticism. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
2 E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS
CRISIS 11 (1997).
3 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J., joined by Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment).
4 E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: How AMERICA'S FAILURE TO TREAT THE
SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 1 (2008).
5 Paul S. Appelbaum, Crazy in the Streets, COMMENTARY, May 1987, at 34, 39.
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"curse[]."6 Rael Jean Isaac and Virginia Armat, in a widely cited 1990
book, wrote:
[P]atient liberation advocates, supposedly engaged in a movement of
reform, left nothing in their wake but hordes of severely ill people
abandoned to the vain "freedom" of the disease that enslaved them.
Secure in their anti-psychiatric dogma that mental illness was a fic-
tion, or at most an artifact of the mental institutions that made
people sick, the mental health bar committed patients to the streets
in the best of conscience. 7
Also in 1990, two prominent commentators wrote that an "ideo-
logical consensus" was emerging "that identifies deinstitutionalization
as one of the era's most stunning public policy failures."8 Over a decade
later, Professor Robert Weisberg wrote that "[i]t is now an axiom that
deinstitutionalization caused the contemporary epidemic of homeless-
ness for the mentally ill."9
Although the trope of deinstitutionalization-as-disaster has taken
on the aura of conventional wisdom, a contrary position exists. Those
who defend deinstitutionalization are much more ambivalent than the
critics, which is perhaps why their voices have not been as widely heard.
Professor David Rothman, whose work both inspired and chronicled an
important episode of the deinstitutionalization movement, 10 provides a
good example of this ambivalence: "That deinstitutionalization has
generally failed to deliver appropriate services to ex-mental patients or
other persons in need of them is hardly debatable," he writes, but "[t]he
question is why the outcome of deinstitutionalization should have been
so grim, and what should be done to remedy the situation."ll But
Professor Rothman and others have nonetheless offered a suitably
6 Amitai Etzioni, Public Policy in Perspective, "Deinstitutionalization": A Public Policy
Fashion, 3 EVALUATION 9 (1976).
7 RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 141 (1990).
8 David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort, Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform,
16 ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 302 (1990).
9 Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of "Community," 2003 UTAH L. REV.
343, 364. Against this backdrop, Professors Gerald Grob and Howard Goldman come across as
amusingly understated when they say: "Although not necessarily a complete failure,
deinstitutionalization can hardly be characterized as a policy triumph." GERALD N. GROB &
HOWARD H. GOLDMAN, THE DILEMMA OF FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH POLICY: RADICAL
REFORM OR INCREMENTAL CHANGE? 15 (2006). Professor Bernard Harcourt similarly finds "the
historical record.., complex," but suggests that the deinstitutionalization movement offers at
least a qualified success story to which advocates of reducing mass penal incarceration should
attend. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionaliza-
tion of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 54 (2011).
10 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE
WILLOWBROOK WARS: BRINGING THE MENTALLY DISABLED INTO THE COMMUNITY (1984).
11 David J. Rothman, The Rehabilitation of the Asylum, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 21, 1991,
http://prospect.org/article/rehabilitation-asylum.
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
modest defense of deinstitutionalization. That defense does not deny
that the results of deinstitutionalization have in many cases been
disappointing. But it challenges the suggestion that deinstitutionaliza-
tion has uniformly been unsuccessful, as well as the causal link critics
seek to draw with the growth of the homeless population. 12 Advocates of
this second story argue that it was cuts to social welfare programs in the
1980s, and not deinstitutionalization itself, that proximately caused the
epidemic of homelessness among those with psychiatric disabilities.13
They also point to a number of examples of successful community-
based programs and services that policymakers and practitioners
developed in the wake of deinstitutionalization. 14 They argue that it was
the failure of federal and state governments to invest in these programs
and services that led to the disappointing results that occurred.15
Heated rhetoric to the contrary, what divides these two stories is
not a disagreement about the facts so much as one about how to
characterize and interpret those facts. Notwithstanding their broad
pronouncements, both supporters and opponents will agree that
deinstitutionalization has caused significant positive results for a large
number of people who would otherwise have been set apart from their
communities and denied the basic interactions of civic life.16 This
12 See, e.g., id. ("[A] process that reached its peak in the 1970s cannot be the root cause of
homelessness in the 1990s.").
13 See Mechanic & Rochefort, supra note 8, at 316 ("[T]he large waves of deinstitutionaliza-
tion occurred with the expansion of social welfare activities in the late 1960s and 1970s,
particularly Medicaid, SSI and SSDI, housing programs, and food stamps. These programs
provided the subsistence base essential for relocating patients to the community. This
subsistence base was not maintained relative to the growing numbers of seriously mentally ill
persons, and in many instances it substantially shrank."); Michael L, Perlin, Book Review, 8
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557, 568 (1991) (reviewing ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM:
THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990)) ("SSI had allowed (encouraged) states to
release patients, since the entitlement program ensured a disability-based, federally-funded
grant to provide for the ex-patients' support in community settings. When these payments
suddenly and dramatically dried up, it should not have been a real surprise to policymakers,
behavioralists (or editorial writers), that some former patients would now be without homes.").
14 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 203
(2000) ("The pages of journals such as American Psychologist or Psychiatric Services are
regularly filled with reports of successful deinstitutionalization programs that have 'worked';
Fuller Torrey's vivid heuristic should not serve to preempt the terms of this important debate."
(footnote omitted)).
15 For a good example, see Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991).
16 See, e.g., GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA'S
MENTALLY ILL 292 (1994) ("Whatever its contradictory and tangled origins, deinstitutionaliza-
tion had positive consequences for a large part of the nation's severely and persistently mentally
ill population."); H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization at the Beginning of the New
Millennium, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS 3, 17 (H. Richard Lamb &
Linda E. Weinberger eds., 2001) ("[O]verall, most chronically and severely mentally ill persons
now live in the community rather than in institutions. With adequate treatment and support,
this change has greatly improved their lot, leading to a much richer life experience and a higher
quality of life.").
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includes many people with psychiatric disabilities-as well as people
with intellectual and developmental disabilities, whose deinstitutionali-
zation has been far less controversial. But there is also little doubt that,
in the wake of deinstitutionalization, a significant number of people
with psychiatric disabilities were left to fend for themselves.
This dispute is not simply a matter of historical interest. The Su-
preme Court's 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,17 which
held that unjustified institutionalization can violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), was followed by a wave of new lawsuits
challenging institutionalization of people with psychiatric, developmen-
tal, and/or physical disabilities.18 The Obama Administration's
Community Living Initiative has led the United States Department of
Justice to move aggressively into this field as well. The Department has,
at last count, filed, joined, or participated in Olmstead suits in twenty-
one states and obtained some significant and far-reaching settlements.19
The question naturally arises whether this new round of deinstitutional-
ization litigation will end in the same place as the litigation of the 1970s
and 1980s.
In this Article, I argue that things will be different this time-
though not necessarily better. The outcomes of the first wave of
deinstitutionalization litigation resulted, I will argue, from the interac-
tion between the political dynamics into which advocates inserted
themselves and the legal claims they employed. In particular, as many
observers have noted, deinstitutionalization in the 1970s and 1980s was
driven by a political alliance between civil libertarians and fiscal
conservatives.20 That alliance could have been expected to hold together
just long enough to move people with disabilities out of expensive
institutional placements but to break down when the time came to
invest in community services. Although commentators have not fully
appreciated the point, the legal claims on which deinstitutionalization
advocates initially relied-due process claims that were triggered by
involuntary institutionalization-gave states far greater incentives to
move people out of institutions than to fund adequate services in the
community.
As I seek to show in this Article, however, both the political dy-
namics and the legal claims have changed significantly. Precisely
17 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 166-184.
19 See Olmstead: DOJ Olmstead Litigation, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/olmstead
olmsteadenforcement.htm (last updated June 22, 2011).
20 The best discussions of the political dynamics of the first two decades of the deinstitu-
tionalization movement, in my view, are ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH
ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990), and PAUL LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
THE WELFARE STATE (1982). I draw on their insights throughout this Article, though I depart
significantly from their arguments in places.
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because the first wave of deinstitutionalization litigation was so
successful in moving residents out of large state institutions for people
with psychiatric and developmental disabilities, the efforts of deinstitu-
tionalization advocates have turned to ensuring the availability of
adequate services in the community. This has shifted the fiscal politics
of the field. Deinstitutionalization advocates now are fighting to expand
the amount of state money spent in the community-and, especially in
tight budget times, to defend existing community services against cuts.
While this change offers the possibility for a rapprochement between
deinstitutionalization advocates and their traditional adversaries (i.e.,
labor unions and parents' organizations), it places the alliance with fiscal
conservatives in serious jeopardy.
At the same time, deinstitutionalization advocates have moved
from the due process theories on which they relied in the 1970s and
1980s to an anti-discrimination theory relying on the ADA and
Olmstead. That theory focuses directly on state resource-allocation
decisions and, far more than due process, affords states a powerful
incentive to create and fund adequate community services.
All of which leaves the future of deinstitutionalization uncertain.
Deinstitutionalization advocates are focused to a greater extent than
ever on the goal of building up a robust community-based treatment
system. And they are employing the most powerful legal tool they have
ever possessed to achieve that goal. But the political partners who helped
them achieve their great success in the first wave of deinstitutionaliza-
tion will likely be the biggest obstacle to success in the next wave.
The key question is whether deinstitutionalization advocates can
make new alliances with the parent and union groups who have
previously been their adversaries. There is in fact a substantial com-
monality of interest between these frequent opponents. As a practical
matter, the overwhelming majority of people with disabilities will never
again be served in large state institutions. That is a trend that is largely
independent of the current wave of deinstitutionalization litigation. But
that litigation can help ensure that, when large state institutions close,
there are adequate and appropriate community-based services for
people who would formerly have been housed there. The sooner
deinstitutionalization advocates, parent organizations, and employee
groups recognize that commonality of interest, the better prepared they
all will be in fighting the politics of fiscal retrenchment. The question is
whether they will recognize it in time to fight effectively for a continued
social investment in services and supports for people with disabilities.
[Vol. 34:1
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I. EXPLAINING DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION'S PAST
From the early 1970s until the 1990s, the deinstitutionalization
movement centered around two major campaigns: the campaign to
close large state mental hospitals, and the campaign to close large state
facilities housing people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.
These campaigns were fought, among other places, in state legislatures,
state executive branches, and the federal courts. These campaigns were
often linked in legal and political strategy, as well as in time, though the
deinstitutionalization of individuals with psychiatric disabilities became
prominent in the public eye first. The rise of the deinstitutionalization
movement in the 1970s and 1980s reflected and created a series of
political dynamics that, until recently, structured legal and policy
developments in the field.
In this Part, I argue that the deinstitutionalization movement in
this period was more successful than commentators typically give it
credit for. The limitations of its success, I argue, stem directly from the
political dynamics into which advocates inserted themselves and the
legal strategies on which they relied. Section A describes the results of
the deinstitutionalization movement's advocacy-results that were
profound but, in the end, did not fully reach advocates' goals. Section B
argues that those results can in significant respects be attributed to the
political dynamics surrounding deinstitutionalization, in which civil
libertarian advocates of closing state mental hospitals and developmen-
tal disability facilities found themselves allied with fiscal conservatives in
state government, and against family and union groups that argued for
broader social provision. That alliance imposed a hydraulic pressure
toward downsizing institutions without providing sufficient services
and supports to enable people with psychiatric or developmental
disabilities to flourish in the community. And, as I argue in Section C,
that hydraulic pressure was exacerbated by the legal-doctrinal tools on
which deinstitutionalization advocates relied. Those advocates relied, in
particular, on due process-based arguments that could regulate
institutionalization but afforded little purchase on the effort to promote
community-based services and supports.
A. The Successes and Failures of Deinstitutionalization
Notwithstanding the near-consensus that it has been a failure, de-
institutionalization has been a success in many significant respects.
Consider first the intellectual/developmental disability context. The
number of people with developmental disabilities confined to state-
operated institutions in the United States peaked at just under 200,000
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
in 1967.21 Since that time, states have closed hundreds of their institu-
tions, and they have downsized many others.22 Institutions like the
Pennhurst State School and Hospital in Pennsylvania (peak census: 3500
in 1955), the Lincoln State School and Colony in Illinois (peak census:
over 5000 in the 1950s), and Letchworth Village in New York (peak
census: over 4000 in the mid-1960s) are now closed.23 The state-
operated institutions that remain are much smaller, housing at most
hundreds, not thousands, of residents.24 As of June 30, 2009, according
to statistics compiled by the Research and Training Center on Commu-
nity Living at the University of Minnesota (RTC), "nine states had
closed all state operated residential facilities with 16 or more residents
with [intellectual or developmental disabilities]."25 And "[o]f the 354
large state operated facilities operating at any time between 1960 and
2008, only 162 facilities (45.7%) in 42 states remained open on June 30,
2009."26
Although every state has significantly reduced its reliance on large
state-operated facilities for people with intellectual disabilities, some
states still have very large numbers of residents in those facilities. The
RTC reports that the average daily population in these facilities across
the country has dropped 74.4% between 1980 and 2009, from 131,345 to
33,682.27 Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have reduced
the population in these facilities by more than 80% over this period of
time. These states, which are geographically and demographically
diverse, are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.28 Of the states not on this list, thirteen continued as of 2009
to confine more than 900 people in congregate, state-operated institu-
tions: Arkansas (1083); California (2391); Florida (1040); Georgia (915);
Illinois (2161); Louisiana (1174); Mississippi (1323); New Jersey (2841);
North Carolina (1629); Ohio (1455); Texas (4629); Virginia (1276); and
Washington (936).29 In Mississippi, the population of these facilities
21 See, e.g., Deborah S. Metzel, Historical Social Geography, in MENTAL RETARDATION IN
AMERICA: A HISTORICAL READER 420, 432 (Steven Noll & James W. Trent Jr. eds., 2004).
22 See K. CHARLIE LAKIN, SHERYL LARSON, PATRICIA SALMI & AMANDA WEBSTER,
RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: STATUS AND TRENDS
THROUGH 2009, at 17-18 (2010), available at rtc.umn.edu/docs/risp2009.pdf.
23 See id. at 19-29.
24 See id.
25 Id. at iii.
26 Id. at iv. The RTC counts the District of Columbia as a "state" for these purposes, so the
number of states adds up to fifty-one.
27 See id. at 4-5.
28 See id. at 5.
29 See id.
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decreased by only 20.3% between 1980 and 2009; in Arkansas, it
decreased by only 30.1%. 30 Perhaps not surprisingly, a number of states
on this list have been the targets of enforcement actions by the Depart-
ment of Justice as it has stepped up its Olmstead program in recent
years.31
In the psychiatric disability area, the numbers are even more stark.
The end-of-year inpatient census in public psychiatric hospitals in the
United States peaked in 1955 at just under 560,000 individuals.32 By
2003, the number had decreased by more than 90% to just under
50,000.33 As Professors Grob and Goldman point out, "[t]he decline was
even more dramatic if general population growth is taken into account.
Had the proportion remained stable and the mix constant, mental
hospitals would have had about 950,000 patients in 2000." 34 The total
number of admissions to these hospitals was significantly higher than
this number might suggest, as 60% of adults admitted to state psychiat-
ric hospitals in 2007 were discharged within thirty days; 35 average length
of stay has gone down dramatically since the 1950s as well.36 And the
total number of public psychiatric hospitals in the United States also
decreased substantially, from 310 as late as 1970 to 220 in 2000.37 As
with developmental disabilities, there is substantial variation across the
states in the numbers, but the overall trend is clear.
Why, then, has a near-consensus developed that deinstitutionaliza-
tion was a failure? The major reason, which relates largely to people
with psychiatric and not developmental disabilities, is the belief that
deinstitutionalization caused an epidemic of "homeless mentally ill."3s It
is undeniable that, at the same time the population of state institutions
was decreasing dramatically, estimates of the number of homeless
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Arkansas, 794 F. Supp. 2d 935 (E.D. Ark. 2011); Disability
Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, Civil No. 05-4723, 2010 WL 3862536 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010) (United
States participated as intervenor and amicus); Settlement Agreement, United States v. Virginia,
Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-059 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter United States v. Virginia
Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement, United States v. Georgia, Civil Action No. 1:10-
CV-249-CAP (N.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter United States v. Georgia Settlement
Agreement].
32 See Ronald W. Manderscheid, Joanne E. Atay & Raquel A. Crider, Changing Trends in
State Psychiatric Hospital Use from 2002 to 2005, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 29 (2009).
33 See id.
34 GROB & GOLDMAN, supra note 9, at 15.
35 See CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
FUNDING AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES, 2007, at 45
(2009), available at http://store.samhsa.gov/product/Funding-and-Characteristics-of-State-
Mental-Health-Agencies-2007/SMA09-4424.
36 JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 130.
37 See GROB & GOLDMAN, supra note 9, at 50.
38 E.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (H. Richard Lamb ed., 1984); E. FULLER TORREY,
NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1988).
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individuals in the United States increased dramatically-tripling in the
182 largest American cities over the course of the 1980s.39 Most analysts
estimate that between one-third and one-half of homeless individuals
have mental illness, and that up to three-quarters of homeless individu-
als have substance abuse problems.40 Because homelessness rose as the
population of state mental hospitals fell, and a large number of homeless
persons have mental illness, a wide array of commentators across the
political spectrum have blamed deinstitutionalization for the rise in
homelessness.4' Professor Michael Perlin, one of the strongest defenders
of deinstitutionalization in the legal academy, describes the argument of
the critics:
The story goes something like this: nurtured by radical psychia-
trists (such as Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing), spurred on by
politically-activist organizations pushing egalitarian social agendas
(such as the ACLU), a cadre of brilliant but diabolical patients' rights
lawyers dazzled sympathetic and out-of-touch judges with their legal
legerdemain-abetted by wooly-headed social theories, inapposite
constitutional arguments, some oh-my-god worst-case anecdotes
about institutional conditions, and a smattering of "heartwarming
successful [deinstitutionalization] cases"-as a result of which courts
entered orders "emptying out the mental institutions" so that pa-
tients could "die with their rights on." When cynical bureaucrats read
the judicial handwriting on the hospital walls, they then joined the
stampede, and the hospitals were emptied. Ergo deinstitutionaliza-
tion. Ergo homelessness. Endgame.42
Professor Perlin argues that this story is "all wrong. Dead wrong.
Obscenely wrong."43 And the critics' argument is, indeed, far too
simplistic. As the sociologist Peter Rossi explained in his landmark
39 See Martha R. Burt, Causes of the Growth of Homelessness During the 1980s, in
UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS: NEW POLICY AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 169, 181 (Dennis
P. Culhane ed., 1997).
40 See, e.g., LITA JANS, SUSAN STODDARD & LEWIS KRAUS, CHARTBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH
AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2004), available at http://library.ncrtm.org/pdf/
G926.0003.01 .pdf.
41 See, e.g., MICHAEL DEAR & JENNIFER WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR: FROM
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO HOMELESSNESS 175 (1987) ("In some respects, an even more
disturbing outcome of deinstitutionalization is the recent and widely publicized increase in the
number of homeless mentally disabled."); JENCKS, supra note 1, at 21 ("[C]onsiderably more
than a quarter of today's homeless might have spent time in a mental hospital if we still ran the
system the way we ran it in the 1950s."); TORREY, supra note 38, at 6-11 (discussing increase in
homelessness as a consequence of deinstitutionalization); Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 37
("Many of the mentally ill, of course, have drifted away entirely from any form of care. Given
the freedom to choose, they have chosen to live on the streets; according to various estimates
they comprise between 40 and 60 percent of homeless persons."); Weisberg, supra note 9, at
364 ("It is now an axiom that deinstitutionalization caused the contemporary epidemic of
homelessness for the mentally ill.").
42 Perlin, supra note 13, at 559-60 (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
43 Id. at 560.
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study of homelessness, "there already were mentally ill persons among
the homeless" before deinstitutionalization, and the prevalence of
psychiatric disability among homeless people may therefore "simply
reflect continuity with the past."44 And as the economist Brendan
O'Flaherty explained in his own book-length treatment of the subject,
"[a]fter 1975, the movement out of state and county mental hospitals
was more than offset by the movement into nursing homes and
correctional institutions, and after 1980 homelessness rose among the
mentally ill because housing conditions got worse."4s
To be sure, we could solve the problem of homelessness among
people with psychiatric disabilities by simply institutionalizing them for
the long term.46 But other policies could solve that problem just as
well-notably supportive housing, in which individuals obtain tenancy
in apartments linked with supportive services.47 And yet, as homeless-
ness was increasing in the 1980s, the federal and state governments were
cutting Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and housing assistance-
the very programs that could pay for community-based housing for
people with psychiatric disabilities.48 The indictment of deinstitutionali-
zation, as opposed to the failure to invest in community-based services
and supports, does not rest on an empirical determination of what
happened in the world so much as on a normative premise that
institutionalization is preferable to community-based housing and
supports. 49 Given the undoubted harms of long-term institutionaliza-
tion for people with psychiatric disabilities, and the viability of
evidence-based community services like supported housing and
44 PETER H. ROSSi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 145
(1989).
45 BRENDAN O'FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF HOMELESSNESS 235 (1996);
see also id. at 227 ("[T]he reason more mentally ill people are homeless is because the
probability of being homeless, given that you are mentally ill and not institutionalized, has risen
substantially. The rise in the number of people who are both mentally ill and not institutional-
ized accounts for almost nothing.").
46 See RoSSI, supra note 44, at 145 (arguing that "noninstitutionalization"-the difficulty in
committing people to institutions-has "strongly" affected homelessness).
47 See sources cited infra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
48 See JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 135-54 (describing unemployment, urban housing
shortages, poverty, and the Reagan Administration's termination of SSI for many people with
mental illness in the early 1980s as the crucial causes of homelessness, and concluding that
"[w]ith so many compelling explanations for the increase in homelessness across the country, it
seems decidedly odd that deinstitutionalization should continue to get the blame, but it does");
JENNIFER WOLCH & MICHAEL DEAR, MALIGN NEGLECT: HOMELESSNESS IN AN AMERICAN CITY
112-48 (1993) (discussing welfare state retrenchment as a cause of homelessness). Even
Professor Jencks, who criticizes deinstitutionalization, acknowledges that "states compounded
[the] problem by cutting their cash payments to the mentally ill." JENCKS, supra note 1, at 34.
49 See Lamb, supra note 16, at 11 ("The two American Psychiatric Association task forces
on the homeless mentally ill concluded that this problem is the result not of deinstitutionaliza-
tion itself but of the way it has been implemented." (citations omitted)); Mechanic & Rochefort,
supra note 8, at 318 ("There is little evidence to support the contention that deinstitutionaliza-
tion is the primary cause of homelessness; it is one of many interacting causes.").
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Assertive Community Treatment (ACT), there is no good reason to
prefer institutionalization as the solution to the homelessness problem
among people with psychiatric disabilities. 50
Still, the failures of the deinstitutionalization movement have been
real. Even if deinstitutionalization did not cause the problem of
homelessness among individuals with psychiatric disabilities, it has not
provided adequate services and supports to those individuals to enable
them to flourish. And, as Professor O'Flaherty's own argument makes
clear, far too many people who would have in the past been confined to
psychiatric hospitals are now in jails or congregate private institutions
like nursing homes and adult-care homes.5a Deinstitutionalization of
people with psychiatric disabilities was by and large successful in
opening the back doors of large state institutions so residents could
leave-and in closing the front doors so that new residents could not
come in. But it was less successful in promoting investments in the kind
of community service infrastructure that enables people with psychiatric
disabilities to thrive in the community.52
50 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 154-55 (arguing that what homeless people with
mental illness need is a home and money); Lamb, supra note 16, at 17 ("With adequate
treatment and support, [deinstitutionalization of "most chronically and severely mentally ill
persons"] has greatly improved their lot, leading to a much richer life experience and a higher
quality of life.").
51 See, e.g., CHRIS KOYANAGI, LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 6 (2007) ("[B]y
1980, 750,000 people with serious mental illness lived in nursing homes, representing 44
percent of the nursing home population."), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?
Section=About the Issue&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=
137545; M. Gregg Bloche & Francine Cournos, Mental Health Policy for the 1990s: Tinkering in
the Interstices, in HEALTH POLICY AND THE DISADVANTAGED 143, 147 (Lawrence D. Brown ed.,
1991) ("The presence of 750,000 mentally disabled persons in nursing homes at the start of the
1980s suggests that there has been large-scale transinstitutionalization.") (citations omitted); E.
Fuller Torrey, Editorial, Jails and Prisons-America's New Mental Hospitals, 85 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1611 (1995) ("Quietly but steadily, jails and prisons are replacing public mental
hospitals as the primary purveyors of public psychiatric services for individuals with serious
mental illnesses in the United States."). For an analysis on people with psychiatric disabilities in
adult care homes, see Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) ("DAI has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its constituents, approximate-
ly 4,300 individuals with mental illness, are not receiving services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs. The adult homes at issue are institutions that segregate residents
from the community and impede residents' interactions with people who do not have
disabilities."), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant
Att'y Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Roy Cooper, Att'y Gen., State of N.C. 1 (July
28, 2011) (finding that North Carolina "plans, structures, and administers its mental health
service system to deliver services to thousands of persons with mental illness in large,
segregated adult care homes, and to allocate funding to serve individuals in adult care homes
rather than in integrated settings."), available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/nc
findingsjletter.pdf.
52 See H. Richard Lamb & Leona L. Bachrach, Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1039, 1039-40 (2001) ("[H]ospital censuses throughout the country
have been drastically reduced, and many would-be admissions to those hospitals have been
blocked, but the critical third process of supplying adequate and accessible community
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When they have considered it at all, commentators have generally
seen deinstitutionalization of people with intellectual and developmen-
tal disabilities as more successful than deinstitutionalization of people
with psychiatric disabilities. People with developmental disabilities do
not make up a significant proportion of homeless persons. 53 And studies
of the individuals who left large state developmental disability institu-
tions like Pennhurst and Willowbrook showed that even people who
had been thought of as the most impaired could still thrive in the
community.54 Still, there remains some controversy regarding deinstitu-
tionalization of people with developmental disabilities.55 And, in some
states, large numbers of people with developmental disabilities live in
nursing homes because of the lack of sufficient community services.56
alternatives to hospitalization has frequently lagged far behind."). For a thoughtful discussion
of the problem, see KOYANAGI, supra note 51, at 2.
53 But cf. Thomas Earl Backer & Elizabeth A. Howard, Cognitive Impairments and the
Prevention of Homelessness: Research and Practice Review, 28 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 375, 379
(2007) ("People with developmental disabilities are more vulnerable to becoming homeless at
two critical junctures. The first occurs when a young person ages out of the care system
designed for children .... The second juncture occurs when parents of a developmentally
disabled person are no longer living.").
54 See JAMES W. CONROY & VALERIE J. BRADLEY, THE PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY: A
REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 313-19 (1985), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/5yrpenn.pdf; ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 220-
53. For more recent reviews of the evidence, which demonstrate that moving from institutions
to the community has led to positive outcomes for people with developmental disabilities, see
Shannon Kim, Sheryl A. Larson & K. Charlie Lakin, Behavioural Outcomes of Deinstitutionali-
sation for People with Intellectual Disability: A Review of US Studies Conducted Between 1980
and 1999, 26 AM. J. ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 35 (2001); and Agnes Kozma,
Jim Mansell & Julie Beadle-Brown, Outcomes in Different Residential Settings for People with
Intellectual Disability: A Systematic Review, 114 AM. J. ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 193 (2009).
55 See, for example, the controversy over whether mortality rates are higher in institutions
or the community, as discussed in James W. Conroy & Miriam Adler, Mortality Among
Pennhurst Class Members, 1978-1989: A Brief Report, 36 MENTAL RETARDATION 380 (1998)
(finding that former Pennhurst residents died at significantly lower rates than they would have
if they had not moved to community residences); Mary F. Hayden, Mortality Among People
with Mental Retardation Living in the United States: Research Review and Policy Application, 36
MENTAL RETARDATION 345 (1998) (reviewing literature and finding it inconclusive); K. Charlie
Lakin, Observations on the California Mortality Studies, 36 MENTAL RETARDATION 395 (1998)
(noting that Strauss et al., infra, reported lower death rates in California's institutions than
California itself did); Kevin F. O'Brien & E.S. Zaharia, Recent Mortality Patterns in California,
36 MENTAL RETARDATION 372 (1998) (finding a trend of declining mortality rates in the
community, but not in institutions, such that the rate was lower in the community than in the
institutions by the end of the 1991-1995 study); and David Strauss, Theodore A. Kastner &
Robert Shavelle, Mortality of Adults with Developmental Disabilities Living in California
Institutions and Community Care, 1985-1994, 36 MENTAL RETARDATION 360 (1998) (finding
significantly higher risk-adjusted mortality rates in the community).
56 See, e.g., Aman Batheja, Many with Developmental Disabilities 'Trapped' in Nursing
Homes, Lawsuit Contends, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 21, 2010,
http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/12/20/2718789/many-with-developmental- disabilities.html
(describing a lawsuit alleging that "[m]ore than 4,500 people with intellectual and developmen-
tal disabilities" in Texas "are 'trapped' in nursing homes providing inadequate care").
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B. The Old Politics of Deinstitutionalization
Civil rights litigation against government agencies often causes
extensive social change only indirectly, by organizing and mobilizing
constituencies outside of government that influence the political
process, 57 and by empowering constituencies within government that
are tasked with responding to or implementing the judgments in
litigation.58 To understand the results of deinstitutionalization litigation
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, one must understand the political goals
of the lawyers who brought that litigation and the political dynamics
into which they inserted themselves.59 In this Section, I argue that it was
those political dynamics that led to the deinstitutionalization move-
ment's great success in reducing the population of state institutions-
and their lesser success in building the robust system of services and
supports that enable people with disabilities to flourish in the commu-
nity.
Advocates of deinstitutionalization had two principal goals. The
first was to move people out of-and keep people from going into-
state institutions. That is the goal I referred to above as opening the back
door and closing the front door. To many civil libertarians at the time,
involuntary commitment (particularly of people with psychiatric
disabilities), looked like nothing more than incarceration, a perception
that was fed by reports of the horrific and nontherapeutic conditions in
many institutions. 60 But while a substantial (and, in the 1960s, expand-
57 See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 131-48 (2d ed. 2004), for the classic expression of this point.
58 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 285-86 (1989). For the point as to litigation generally, see Margo Schlanger,
Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and
Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1 (2008).
59 On the importance of the goals and strategies of lawyers in institutional reform litigation,
see Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999).
60 For a leading expression of this point at the time, see BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF
PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW (Avon Books 1974) (1972); and
see also Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 36 ("Mentally ill persons seemed particularly appropriate
targets for a crusade against governmental power, for the state was depriving them of liberty-
with ostensibly benevolent aims, yet in conditions that belied the goal of treatment."). Albert
Deutsch's 1948 book documented the horrific conditions in state mental hospitals. See ALBERT
DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948). Burton Blatt and Fred Kaplan's Christmas in
Purgatory similarly documented horrific conditions in developmental disability institutions
nearly two decades later. See BURTON BLATT & FRED KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY: A
PHOTOGRAPHIC ESSAY ON MENTAL RETARDATION (1966). And civil libertarian lawyers began
to challenge the allegedly therapeutic nature of confinement. For example, state psychiatric
hospitals often claimed that they provided "milieu therapy," which advocates claimed was too
often in practice simply a euphemism for custodial confinement. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569 (1975) ("O'Connor described Donaldson's treatment as 'milieu
therapy.' But witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the context of this case, 'milieu
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ing) array of procedural protections preceded the decision to incarcerate
someone in a prison, comparatively few protections preceded the
decision to incarcerate someone in a psychiatric or developmental
disability institution. Civil libertarians saw institutionalization as an end
run around the criminal procedure revolution; they sought to extend the
(new) protections of the criminal process to the context of civil
institutionalization.61
In the psychiatric disability context especially, these general civil
libertarian ideas mixed with a specific critique, somewhat in vogue
during the 1960s and 1970s, of psychiatric diagnosis as a form of social
control.62 A person who was persuaded that mental illness was a "myth,"
or just a label placed by powerful professionals and social institutions on
people they regarded as deviant, would necessarily be highly concerned
with a process that attached the state's carceral power to psychiatric
diagnosis, especially without the protections of the criminal process.
63
It has never been clear that many advocates of deinstitution-
alization ever went all the way to believing that mental illness was a
myth-and the position that developmental disabilities were mythical
certainly never had any prominence. 64 But one did not have to take that
extreme view to believe that institutionalization-as it existed in the
therapy' was a euphemism for confinement in the 'milieu' of a mental hospital."); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("[I]t may not be assumed that confinement in a
hospital is beneficial 'environmental therapy' for all." (footnotes omitted)); ALAN A. STONE,
LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 50 (1984) ("Like the person who sees
that the Emperor has no clothes, Judge Bazelon told the psychiatrists that mere confinement in
the John Howard Pavilion did not constitute milieu therapy."). Indeed, the complaint in the
challenge to institutionalization at New York's Willowbrook State School explicitly alleged "that
'Willowbrook is not a therapeutic institution. It more closely resembles a prison .... ' Herbert
A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.
763, 782 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting the complaint).
61 An important bridging case here was In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the
Supreme Court held that significant elements of constitutional criminal procedure must apply
in juvenile delinquency proceedings-proceedings that, like civil commitment proceedings, had
been justified as providing treatment and rehabilitation, not punishment. See id. at 15-16.
62 The key texts here were THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS
OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961), and R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE
(1967). Many also cite ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961), as forming part of the same critique, but I
have always read Goffman less as challenging psychiatric diagnosis itself than as describing and
explaining the social interactions and responses of those who have been confined to psychiatric
hospitals.
63 These concerns might have also been seemingly validated by the extreme case of the
Soviet Union's use of psychiatry to stifle dissent. See STONE, supra note 60, at 3-36.
64 In recent years, by contrast, the so-called neurodiversity movement has urged something
very much like a myth-of-mental-illness position in the context of autism and even, in some
cases, intellectual disabilities. See, e.g., THOMAS ARMSTRONG, NEURODIVERSITY: DISCOVERING
THE EXTRAORDINARY GIFTS OF AUTISM, ADHD, DYSLEXIA, AND OTHER BRAIN DIFFERENCES
(2010); Amy Harmon, Nominee to Disability Council is Lightning Rod for Dispute on Views of
Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A16; Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement,
NEW YORK, June 2, 2008, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/.
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1960s and 1970s, to be sure, and perhaps inherently-was oppressive,
dehumanizing, and antitherapeutic.65 Even if one did not believe that
mental illness was a myth, the risk of erroneous diagnosis and the
massive deprivation of liberty attending institutionalization raised
serious civil libertarian concerns. 66
The second goal of deinstitutionalization advocates, often ignored
by critics but just as important for most of the advocates themselves,
was to develop an array of services and supports in the community that
would enable people with psychiatric disabilities or intellectu-
al/developmental disabilities to flourish.67 Thus, in the retainer
agreement with his clients in the landmark Willowbrook suit, plaintiffs'
attorney Bruce Ennis described the "ultimate goal" of the litigation as
one of promoting "community-based alternatives (including halfway
houses, hostels, group homes, community education and training
programs, etc.), so that Willowbrook (and similar institutions) can be
promptly and completely phased out of existence."68
In seeking to achieve these goals, deinstitutionalization advocates
confronted two powerful constituencies: the parents and other family
members of those who had been institutionalized (particularly in the
developmental disability context), and the workers at state facilities
(often represented by their unions). To be sure, these groups were not
uniformly hostile to deinstitutionalization litigation, especially in the
early days. Parents and family members actually played a key role in
early deinstitutionalization litigation in the developmental disability
context. Many parents who had sent their children to institutions before
the 1970s had felt they had no choice but to do so. Frequently, their
family doctors had told them that their children would be an intolerable
burden if not placed in an institution. 69 And there was typically no
network of community-based services that would have enabled these
parents to keep their children at home even if they had wanted to.70
65 See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 1, at 29 ("Since many mental hospitals really did deprive
patients of rights accorded almost every other human being, and since the therapeutic
rationales offered for many hospital rules seemed unpersuasive, many people (including me)
found these antiauthoritarian critiques quite persuasive.").
66 See ENNIS, supra note 60, at 235-53.
67 See, e.g., JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
SAFETY NET 54 (2006) ("[Rleformers sought as a final goal to replace the asylum with a
community-based system of mental health care, a policy that would allow people with mental
disorders to live in their home neighborhoods and to enjoy all the rights and social privileges
offered to the able-bodied.").
68 ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 62.
69 See JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 241-42 (1994).
70 Prior to early- 1970s decisions like Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972), and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972), and Congress's passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, there was no
requirement that states even provide schooling for children with intellectual disabilities. See
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Although patterns of visitation and continuing connections varied,
many retained a strong interest in the well-being of the children they
had sometimes reluctantly institutionalized.71 These parents were
horrified by the conditions in the institutions in which their children
resided. Many came to support litigation to challenge those conditions,
and perhaps give their children an opportunity to live in the communi-
ty.72 Individual parents, along with chapters of parents' organizations
like (what was then called) the Association for Retarded Children,
served as plaintiffs in the early developmental disabilities deinstitution-
alization cases. 73 Even the parent and family associations of particular
state institutions, which often took on the feel of "company unions,"74
were plaintiffs in some of these cases. 75 In the psychiatric disability
context as well, families of institutionalized persons played a key role in
early-1970s efforts to improve conditions in, and move people out of,
mental hospitals.76
Similarly, workers in institutions were among the drivers of some
of the early deinstitutionalization litigation. The Wyatt case, 77 which
resulted in the closure of most of Alabama's institutions for people with
psychiatric and developmental disabilities, was originally brought by a
group of employees to challenge a cut in their wages. 78 And it was
professional employees at New York's Willowbrook State School,
radicalized by the politics of the 1960s and deploring the conditions at
the institution, who directed the publicity campaign (and organized the
Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism to Collaboration, in LAW AND
SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 205, 209-13 (Jay P.
Heubert ed., 1999).
71 See ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 17-22. Judith Gran, who represented the
plaintiffs in a number of developmental disability deinstitutionalization cases, identified "two
groups of parents who institutionalize their children": (1) "upper middle class" parents who
"focus on a cure for their children's disabilities," institutionalize them when it fails, and "are
angry and bitter, often feeling hopeless and reject their child"; and (2) "typically working class
families, often from minority communities, who do everything they can to keep their children
at home" and only "reluctantly institutionalize their children." Burton Blatt Keynote Address
Excerpt, MNDDC.ORG, http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/one/sidebar/040a.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2012). This story seems to me a bit too pat and politically congenial. Perhaps another
way of putting the point is that families with higher socioeconomic status have generally had
more resources to ensure that their children received services in the community, so that when
those families have nonetheless opted for institutionalization it has more often been a true
choice.
72 See ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 45-50.
73 See id. at 60.
74 Id. at 22.
75 See id. at 60.
76 See Philip R. Beard, The Consumer Movement, in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AFTER WORLD
WAR II: 1944-1994, at 299, 309-13 (Roy W. Menninger & John C. Nemiah eds., 2000).
77 See infra text accompanying notes 121-123.
78 See Jack Drake, Drafting the Case: The Parallel Legacies of Wyatt v. Stickney and Lynch v.
Baxley, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 167, 167 (2011).
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residents and their families) to challenge institutionalization there.79
But these alliances between deinstitutionalization lawyers and
family and worker groups did not last. Although some family members
of institutionalized persons with developmental disabilities wholeheart-
edly agreed with the agenda of providing their loved ones with homes
and services in the community, others had originally signed up to
challenge what they thought were bad institutions-not the idea of
institutionalization itself.80 Some of the parents in this latter group
withdrew from the litigation-as the mother of Terri Lee Halderman,
the lead plaintiff in the landmark Pennhurst case, did.81 Others formed
organizations that actively opposed deinstitutionalization. These
organizations, which overlapped with the parent and guardian associa-
tions of a number of institutions, lobbied against, and intervened in
litigation to oppose, deinstitutionalization in the developmental
disabilities context.8 2 Some tension existed in the psychiatric disability
context as well. The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), the
largest group representing families of people with psychiatric disabili-
ties, did push to "restor[e] .. some form of involuntary commitment
law," for example, though NAMI's advocacy of supportive housing was
very much in accord with the views of deinstitutionalization advocates.83
And the unions that represented workers in institutions could not
support deinstitutionalization without undermining the livelihood of
their members-and, in their view, the care and treatment they
provided. Jobs in state institutions have typically been unionized in this
country, while most jobs in community programs have not.8 4 Commu-
nity programs are generally run not by the state itself but by private
non-profit or for-profit agencies that contract with the state. Those
private agencies are rarely unionized, and they typically pay substantial-
ly less (and have much greater turnover) than the state does for work in
79 See ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 34-42.
80 See Margie Peterson, Did Suit Help Retarded? Woman Regrets Role in Pennhurst Case,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, July 18, 1994, at Al.
81 See id.
82 See id.; John Woestendiek, Objections Voiced to Plan for Closing of Pennhurst, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 26, 1984, at B6. For examples of efforts by parents' groups to intervene in
litigation in order to oppose deinstitutionalization, see Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1229, 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (granting intervention but rejecting
parents' group's objections); and Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (denying
intervention), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983). For a general discussion of the
phenomenon at the time, see Robinsue Frohboese & Bruce Dennis Sales, Parental Opposition to
Deinstitutionalization: A Challenge in Need of Attention and Resolution, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
1(1980).
83 See Beard, supra note 76, at 312-13.
84 See STEVEN J. TAYLOR, THE DIRECT SUPPORT WORKFORCE CRISIS: CAN UNIONS HELP
RESOLVE THIS? (2008), available at http://disabilitystudies.syr.edu/docs/directsupportworkforce
crisis.pdf.
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its institutions.85 Indeed, unions have found it exceptionally difficult to
organize the small, decentralized, often non-profit and faith-based
agencies that provide community services.86
Eventually, the parent and family organizations that opposed fur-
ther deinstitutionalization of people with developmental disabilities
came together in a national group known as the Voice of the Retarded
(now simply VOR), a group that allied closely with the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and
other unions representing institutional workers. VOR and its affiliates
conducted a well-organized campaign that sponsored research,
organized parents politically, managed public relations, and participated
in litigation.87 By the late 1980s, the VOR-union alliance was the most
significant obstacle to further deinstitutionalization of people with
developmental disabilities.88
Parents who opposed deinstitutionalization argued that, while
abuses should end, institutions were the best place for their (often now
adult) children. They contended that institutional placement was
necessary for many people with developmental disabilities (including
their children) to receive the services they needed; that their children
needed protection from risk and could not be trusted with the choices
they would be required to make to live life in the community; that the
group homes to which many people with developmental disabilities
were deinstitutionalized were even more dangerous and isolating than
institutions; and that institutions could be readily overseen for abuse,
while group homes could not.8 9 As more and more people with
developmental disabilities left large state institutions, these parents
urged that those who remained in institutions were the hardest cases-
the ones most in need of institutional care.90
85 See, e.g., Roger J. Stancliffe, K. Charlie Lakin, John R. Shea, Robert W. Prouty & Kathryn
Coucouvanis, The Economics of Deinstitutionalization, in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 289, 295 (Roger J.
Stancliffe & K. Charlie Lakin eds., 2005).
86 See, e.g., EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE (2012); Nari Rhee & Carol Zabin,
Aggregating Dispersed Workers: Union Organizing in the "Care" Industries, 40 GEOFORUM 969
(2009).
87 See Speaking Out for People with Intellectual Disabilities & Mental Retardation, VOR,
http://www.vor.net/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
88 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 84, at 6 (describing how the union representing California
institutional employees in the late 1990s "joined with institutional parent groups in advocating
for a moratorium on community placements"); Steven M. Eidelman, Foreword to COSTS AND
OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra
note 85, at xix-xx ("[Ain unholy alliance between certain public employee unions, institution
employees, and some families has kept many public institutions open long beyond the time
when they should have been closed.").
89 For parents making all of these points, see Peterson, supra note 80.
90 For a recent example, see Press Release, Southbury Training Sch. Home & Sch. Ass'n.,
Inc., DDS Previously Found No Significant Savings in Closing Southbury Training Sch. 2 (Sept.
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The unions that represented institutional workers echoed these
points. Deinstitutionalization, they argued, represented nothing more
than a conservative effort to cut public budgets and impose privatization
at the expense of people who were poor and vulnerable. Like the
parents' organizations, unions such as AFSCME argued that many
people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities need institution-
alization, and that the people who remained in institutions as
deinstitutionalization progressed really, really needed to be there.
Deinstitutionalization threw people out of caring, supportive environ-
ments onto the streets to fend for themselves. These arguments were
distilled and presented in a widely circulated AFSCME report, Out of
Their Beds and into the Streets.91
With such politically powerful constituencies arrayed against them,
advocates of deinstitutionalization could not have reduced institutional
populations so dramatically without powerful allies. They found those
allies in fiscal conservatives. Large state institutions are expensive, and
deinstitutionalization advocates argued that people with psychiatric and
developmental disabilities could be served just as well, and far more
cheaply, in the community.92 Fiscal conservatives seized the opportunity
to save money in the sluggish economy-and concomitantly tight fiscal
19, 2011), available at www.vor.net/-vornet/images/STSCostPressRelease20ll.pdf ("Interme-
diate Care Facilities such as STS serve a population of clients who are much more intellectually
disabled, medically involved, and older on average than DDS clients in the community system,
and therefore need more services."). There is good reason to doubt this conclusion. Studies that
make an apples-to-apples comparison of people with similar diagnoses and characteristics in
and out of institutions have tended to find that it remains cheaper-often substantially so-to
provide services in the community than in an institutional setting. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED LONG-
TERM CARE SERVICES 18 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/20O0/costeff.pdf
(stating that studies controlling for resident characteristics in the developmental disability
context find that community-based services cost 75-95% of what institutional services cost).
91 HENRY STANTIESTEVAN, AM. FED'N OF STATE, CNTY. & MUN. EMPS.,
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: OUT OF THEIR BEDS AND INTO THE STREETS (1976).
92 For examples of early cases relying in part on the cost differences between institutions
and community services in ordering deinstitutionalization, see Homeward Bound, Inc. v.
Hissom Mem'l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at *17 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), judgment reinstated
on other grounds on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); and see also
ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 109 ("Plaintiffs' closing point [in the second
Willowbrook trial] was that community care would be far cheaper than institutional care and all
the requisite funds were already available to the Department of Mental Hygiene."); compare
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 483 (D.N.D. 1982) (finding
unpersuasive plaintiffs' claim that community services were cheaper than institutions), affid,
713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). For the perspective of an advocate and sometime state
government official, see Eidelman, supra note 88, at xix ("Even when state governments did not
despair over wretched conditions in their institutions, or even accept that the human rights and
full citizenship promised their states' residents applied to people with disabilities, they did
understand 'cheaper,' and, as this concept got us where we wanted (i.e., people with disabilities
living in the community), we took it as success.").
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environment-of the 1970s. Ronald Reagan provided the template for
this left-right alliance when, as governor of California, he supported the
1967 Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which restricted civil commitments
to the state's mental hospitals, and the 1969 Lanterman Act, which
expanded community services for people with developmental disabili-
ties. 93 The enactment of the SSI program in 1972, which used federal
funds to provide cash benefits to people with mental disabilities living in
the community, further enabled states to shift costs off of their budgets
by deinstitutionalizing.94 As stagflation imposed great pressure on state
budgets, alliances like these-often spurred by litigation, but ultimately
encapsulated in state legislation and administrative action-arose in
many states.95
As many commentators have noted, it was ultimately this coalition
between civil liberties lawyers and fiscal conservatives that ensured that
states would close and downsize their institutions.96 The strength of this
coalition also explains the precise pattern of results that deinstitutionali-
zation litigation caused. Although deinstitutionalization advocates had
two basic goals-shrinking institutions and building community
services-fiscal conservatives shared only the first of these goals.97 It
should not be surprising that the coalition of deinstitutionalization
advocates and fiscal conservatives largely achieved their goal of closing
and downsizing institutions and that deinstitutionalization advocates
were less successful in achieving their goal of developing community
services.
93 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 50 (1994); EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS: REPEALING
THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA 125 (1972); JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 99;
Andrew M. Holmes, Note, Initiative Funding Through Targeted Taxes: Proposition 63, Mental
Health, and the Crossroads of Direct Democracy, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 199-200 (2007).
94 See JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 96-100; William Gronfein, Incentives and Intentions in
Mental Health Policy: A Comparison of the Medicaid and Community Mental Health Programs,
26 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 192, 200-02 (1985).
95 Reviewing the literature, Mechanic and Rochefort argue that the degree to which a state
deinstitutionalized during this period depended in significant part on "the vigor and efficacy of
the indigenous community mental health coalition, including its civil libertarian contingent" in
the state, and "the amount of economic strain faced by a given state with the stagflation of the
1970s." Mechanic & Rochefort, supra note 8, at 311.
96 See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 1, at 39 ("It was the insidious combination of liberal policies
aimed at increasing personal liberty and conservative policies aimed at reducing government
spending that led to catastrophe.").
97 Governor Ronald Reagan, again, epitomized this position by supporting closure of
institutional beds and then cuts to community services. See Jackson K. Putnam, Governor
Reagan: A Reappraisal, 83 CAL. HIST., no. 4, 2006, at 24, 30-31; Holmes, supra note 93, at 200.
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C. Due Process and the Old Law of Deinstitutionalization
The reasons for the outcomes of deinstitutionalization were not
merely political, though. They also reflected limitations in the doctrinal
tools on which deinstitutionalization advocates relied in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. Beginning in the 1960s, but really hitting stride in the
1970s, deinstitutionalization advocates developed a legal strategy that
relied centrally on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Advocates pursued two lines of due process doctrine: (1) a line of
procedural limitations on involuntary commitment and treatment; and
(2) a line of substantive guarantees of treatment for people confined to
state institutions.98 These lines of doctrine developed relatively concur-
rently, though the right-to-treatment line gradually became more
prominent as the period progressed. Each line of doctrine led to
substantial gains for the deinstitutionalization movement. But each also
had very serious limitations as a tool for achieving the goals of that
movement.
In this Section, I discuss those gains and limitations. Subsection 1
discusses the procedural due process line of doctrine, which I label the
"right-against-treatment" cases. Subsection 2 discusses the substantive
due process line of doctrine, which I, like most observers, label the
"right-to-treatment" cases.
1. The Right-Against-Treatment Line
The litigation seeking a right against unwanted commitment and
treatment proceeded from straightforward civil libertarian principles.
As I described in the previous Section, civil libertarian lawyers were
concerned that involuntary commitment incarcerated people without
the protections of the criminal process. They sought to address these
98 These two due process theories did not exhaust the theories on which plaintiffs relied in
early deinstitutionalization cases, but none of the others played as crucial a role. For example,
in the landmark Pennhurst case, the district court found a violation not just of the due process
right to treatment but also of the Equal Protection Clause. Its equal protection holding,
however, relied more or less entirely on its conclusion that the state had denied Pennhurst
residents the right to adequate treatment. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446
F. Supp. 1295, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("As we have heretofore discussed in this opinion, the
retarded at Pennhurst have been segregated in an institution in which they have been and are
being denied minimally adequate habilitation. Thus, on the basis of this record we find that the
retarded at Pennhurst have been and presently are being denied their Equal Protection Rights
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."). Plaintiffs in these cases
also relied on federal statutes, such as the predecessor to the ADA, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794). But
these statutory claims had mixed success and played little ultimate role in the deinstitutionali-
zation litigation of the 1970s and 1980s. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600
n.11 (1999).
[Vol. 34:1
2012] DEINSTITUTIONALIZA TION LITIGATION 23
concerns by developing a line of doctrine that imposed significant
procedural protections prior to institutionalization. The key case in this
line was Lessard v. Schmidt,99 which adopted something very close to a
criminal procedure model for the involuntary commitment process.
Lessard held that individuals subject to civil commitment must receive a
"judicial hearing to determine whether or not probable cause exists"
regarding their committability if they were detained in excess of forty
eight hours;100 that they are entitled to "the privilege against self-
incrimination";101 that they have the right to counsel in commitment
hearings, including court-appointed counsel if they are indigent;102 that
"the rules of evidence including the hearsay rule" must apply in
commitment hearings;103 and, most importantly, that a person could not
be committed without "a finding beyond reasonable doubt" that:
(a) the subjects of the hearing are mentally ill; (b) the subjects of the
hearing are dangerous to themselves or others based at minimum
upon a recent act, attempt, or threat to do substantial harm; (c) all
available less drastic alternatives to commitment to a mental hospital
or institution have been investigated; and (d) all available less drastic
alternatives to commitment to a mental hospital or institution are
unsuitable. 104
Lessard's least restrictive alternative principle, in particular, was
extremely influential.105 The Lessard doctrine, as adopted across the
nation, succeeded in reducing involuntary commitments and, ultimate-
ly, the population of state mental hospitals.106 But the right-against-
treatment principles that Lessard adopted had substantial drawbacks for
deinstitutionalization advocates. The biggest problem was that the right
against treatment was a purely negative right. Where people were
99 (Lessard 1), 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), judgment reinstated on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976).
100 Lessard v. Schmidt (Lessard IT), 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (E.D. Wis. 1974); cf. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (imposing same requirement in criminal context).
101 Lessard II, 379 F. Supp. at 1379.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. (emphasis added).
105 See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commit-
ment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 54, 55 (1982) ("[F]ollowing Lessard,
numerous cases found state commitment laws unconstitutional and applied stringent
substantive and procedural due process protections to the involuntary commitment process.");
Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise" Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the
Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOuS. L.
REv. 999, 1014-18 (2000) (explaining how courts, commentators, and legislators in the
majority of states endorsed this principle for civil commitment).
106 See APPELBAUM, supra note 93, at 28; JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO
THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 90
(1992).
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institutionalized not because of state compulsion through involuntary
commitment but because they had no other effective options for
obtaining treatment, the doctrine offered little purchase. More im-
portantly, the doctrine could keep states from committing people to
mental hospitals, but it provided no resources for obtaining necessary
mental health services in the community.
Relatedly, the right-against-treatment doctrine reflected an undue
skepticism regarding the value of treatment for psychiatric disabilities.
To be sure, the treatment provided at state institutions offered ample
reason to be skeptical. In many cases, that treatment was merely
custodial, more concerned with achieving quiescence and control than
in promoting recovery. 107 And institutionalization itself deprives
institutionalized persons of liberty, agency, and the opportunity to
participate in the life of the community.108 But later developments have
demonstrated the value of various forms of community-based treatment
even for people with serious mental illness.109 By viewing treatment as
something to be avoided and restricted, the right-against-treatment
doctrine tended to deprive people with psychiatric disabilities of services
that would have promoted their happiness and flourishing.
In the end, the right-against-treatment doctrine was largely domes-
ticated, if not neutered, by the Supreme Court. Although the 1975
decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson 110 contained language that suggested
agreement with Lessard's underpinnings,"' a number of subsequent
cases through the Burger and Rehnquist Courts rejected many of the key
principles articulated in Lessard. In Allen v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in civil
commitment proceedings.112 In Addington v. Texas, the Court held that
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was not constitutionally
required in those proceedings, either.113 And in Youngberg v. Romeo,114
the Court held that only "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement
conditions"-rather than the least restrictive such conditions-were
107 Many of the conditions discussed in ENNIS, supra note 60, reflect this aim for control
rather than recovery.
108 This is a central point of Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) ("[C]onfinement in an institution severely diminishes the
everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options,
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.").
109 See Lamb, supra note 16, at 7-8.
110 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
111 See id. at 576 ("In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members or friends.").
112 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986); accord French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C.
1977), summarily affd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979).
113 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
114 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
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required.115 Some procedural protections remain against involuntary
commitment, 116 though a stronger set of protections continues to guard
against involuntary medication. 17
2. The Right-to-Treatment Line
A second line of cases, developed around the same time as the
right-against-treatment line (and occasionally by the same lawyers),
focused on developing a right to treatment for institutionalized persons.
This line of decisions, unlike the right-against-treatment line, had
significant implications for both people with psychiatric disabilities and
those with developmental disabilities.
The right-to-treatment doctrine was rooted in substantive, rather
than procedural, due process. It drew on two key ideas, one of which
was in tension with the right-against-treatment line, the other of which
was largely consistent with it. Both of these ideas appeared in a 1960
article in the American Bar Association Journal by Morton Birnbaum, a
medical doctor who worked as a lawyer in his spare time (really!).118 The
first idea rested on evolving professional notions of proper treatment for
people with mental disabilities. In the emerging view of cutting-edge
practitioners at the time, treatment should be designed to promote the
acquisition of skills necessary to live outside of an institution.l19 The
second idea, which in some ways was the flip side of the right-against-
treatment argument, was the notion of a quid pro quo-if states were to
confine people for care and treatment, the argument went, they were
bound to actually provide that treatment. 120
The key early case in the right-to-treatment line was Wyatt v.
Stickney.121 Wyatt, a challenge to conditions of institutionalization of
people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities in Alabama,
ultimately led to the closing of nearly all of the state's large state-
115 See PERLIN, supra note 14, at 278 (criticizing Youngberg's "abandonment of the least-
restrictive-alternative construction").
116 These include, most notably, the requirement that the state establish committability by
clear and convincing evidence. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33.
117 For discussion of the right to refuse medication in the civil context, see PERLIN, supra
note 14, at 127-30. For discussion of that right in the criminal context, see, for example, Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
118 Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960). For a fascinating
discussion of Dr. Birnbaum's advocacy of a right to treatment, and its connections to and
tensions with the civil libertarian advocacy of others in the deinstitutionalization movement,
see Rebecca Birnbaum, My Father's Advocacy for a Right to Treatment, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 115 (2010).
119 See Morton Birnbaum, supra note 118, at 500.
120 See id. at 503.
121 The first published opinion in Wyatt was Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971). The last was Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Sawyer, 219 F.R.D. 529 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
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operated institutions. In finding a constitutional right to treatment, the
Wyatt court relied explicitly on the quid pro quo theory: "The purpose
of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and
not mere custodial care or punishment. This is the only justification,
from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to
mental institutions .... "122 Over the next thirty-plus years, the court
(presided over first by Judge Frank Johnson, then by Judge Myron
Thompson) issued a series of orders to reform Alabama's facilities and
ultimately transform its mental health and developmental disability
system to one that was oriented around community rather than
institutional treatment. 123
The Supreme Court ultimately addressed the right to treatment in
Youngberg v. Romeo,124 one of many cases to come from the behemoth
Pennhurst State School and Hospital.125 The Court cut back on the right
to treatment recognized by lower courts, but it still offered litigants
significant tools for promoting such a right. Youngberg involved an
individual with an intellectual disability who was then institutionalized
at Pennhurst. He sought damages for injuries he had experienced in the
institution, as well as for the failure to provide him "minimally adequate
habilitation."26 The Court readily concluded that institutionalized
persons have a liberty interest in safety and freedom from undue
restraint, 127 and it also held that such persons have a right to "minimally
adequate care and treatment" to serve those liberty interests.128 But the
Court held that "courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional" to serve those liberty interests: "the decision,
if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be
imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment."29 As Professor Perlin argues, the
122 Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784; see also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir.
1974) (describing court's prior holding that "where the justification for commitment was
treatment, it offended the fundamentals of due process if treatment were not in fact provided,"
and "where the justification was the danger to self or to others, then treatment had to be
provided as the quid pro quo society had to pay as the price of the extra safety it derived from
the denial of individuals' liberty").
123 See Drake, supra note 78, at 168.
124 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
125 The most notable case was itself a behemoth, the Halderman litigation. The first reported
opinion in Halderman was Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977). The last reported opinion in Halderman was Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hospital, 9 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
126 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-19.
127 See id. at 315-16.
128 Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 Id. at 322-23.
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professional judgment standard "sharply limits the need to inquire into
the adequacy of a patient's treatment."130
A number of observers were, from the start, ambivalent about the
right-to-treatment line of doctrine. Thomas Szasz, for example,
explained that he thought a right to treatment could end up supporting
institutionalization-and even leading to the recognition of institution-
alization as an individual right and a governmental duty.131 But
advocates of deinstitutionalization brought a large number of cases
relying on that right. The calculation they made was that implementing
a right to treatment within institutions-a right that, as interpreted by
Wyatt, required bringing conditions in those institutions up to accepted
standards132-would impose such a financial burden on states that they
would find it more economical to keep people out of institutions and
eventually move institutional residents to the community.133 In the
developmental disability world in particular, events proved that
calculation to be correct in many instances, as cases like Wyatt in
Alabama and Jackson v. Fort Stanton 134 in New Mexico led to the closing
of all public developmental disability institutions in those states, and
other cases led to the closing of many individual developmental
disability institutions.135
130 PERLIN, supra note 14, at 122.
131 See THOMAS SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY 109-31 (1977); see also Thomas Szasz,
Introduction to ENNIS, supra note 60, at xvii ("[1Individuals incriminated as mentally ill do not
need guarantees of 'treatment,' but protection against their enemies-the legislators, judges,
and psychiatrists who persecute them in the name of mental health.").
132 See, for example, the famous "Wyatt standards," which imposed detailed requirements
for staffing and conditions throughout the institution. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-
86 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
133 See ERKULWATER, supra note 67, at 58 ("[I1f courts broadly applied the mandated
reforms articulated in Wyatt and other patients' rights cases, then many state mental
institutions would be unable to meet the increased costs, thus forcing them to close their doors
forever."); ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 54 n.* ("Many lawyers, including Ennis,
wanted to use the doctrine as a way of emptying mental hospitals; confident that the states
would never be able to make the institutions therapeutic, they saw right to treatment as a tool
for prying patients loose from horrendous settings."). Writing before the Supreme Court
pruned back some of the district court's key holdings in the Pennhurst case, David Ferleger, the
lead plaintiffs attorney in the case, argued that the components of a right to treatment
recognized by the district court added up as a matter of doctrine to a constitutional right to
community treatment. See David Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The
Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717, 731-43 (1979). But the doctrine ultimately
did not move in that direction. For the Supreme Court's decisions in Pennhurst, see Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); and Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
134 See Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
135 See, e.g., PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
EMERGING WORKFORCE 82 (1998) ("The Hissom litigation eventually led to a settlement
between the plaintiffs and the state to close the institution in May 1994 and to place its
approximately 350 to 400 residents in community settings."); JULIE ANN RACINO, GARRITY V.
GALLEN: THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN INSTITUTIONAL CLOSURE (1993), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED374608
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The right-to-treatment doctrine had some important features that
showed promise for deinstitutionalization advocates. For one thing,
unlike the right against treatment, the right to treatment was framed as
more of an affirmative right to services-though one that, critically, still
was conditioned on state commitment or custody.136 The right against
treatment left two possibilities: either a person could be committed
involuntarily, in which case the right against treatment was properly
overcome, or the person could not be committed involuntarily, in which
case the state was under no obligation to provide anything. Under the
right-to-treatment doctrine, by contrast, the state took on a responsibil-
ity, once it institutionalized an individual, to provide treatment and
services-treatment and services that in many cases would tend to
enable the person to leave the institution.137 And some courts took the
right to treatment even further, to argue that a state continued to owe a
duty to formerly institutionalized persons to provide them treatment in
the community to make up for the failure to provide them appropriate
treatment in the institution. 138 That principle could not readily extend to
people who had never been institutionalized, however.
(stating that the Garrity case led to closure of New Hampshire's only developmental disabilities
institution); UNIV. OF MINN. RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. ON CMTY. LIVING & THE LEWIN
GRP., MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES PROGRAM IN VERMONT: FINAL
REPORT 8 (2000), available at http://rtc.umn.edu/misc/pubcount.asp?publicationid=73 (stating
that settlement in Brace lawsuit led to closure of Vermont's only developmental disabilities
institution); David Braddock & Tamar Heller, The Closure of Mental Retardation Institutions:
Trends and Implications 11 (Inst. for the Study of Developmental Disabilities, Working Paper,
1984), available at http://www.mnddc.org/parallels2/pdf/80s/84/84-PPM-UOI.pdf (discussing
closure of "Pennhurst (PA), Orient (OH), and Plymouth (MI)" after "intense and protracted
litigation"); see also Steven Schwartz, The Potential and Risks of Relying on Title II's Integration
Mandate to Close Segregated Institutions, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 871-73 (2010) (citing cases
that preceded institutional closure in many states).
136 There is some degree of dispute in the federal courts regarding whether Youngberg's
right-to-treatment protections are triggered only by involuntary commitment or instead by the
simple fact that an individual is in the state's custody and control (even if she voluntarily
submitted herself to that control). See United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 653-57 (6th
Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).
137 See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 97 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring) ("Because
it appears from the numerous, uncontradicted doctors' reports in the record that placement in
a CLA [community living arrangement] is the only or best way for Ms. Clark to receive the
training that she is due, I believe that she has a right to placement in the CLA, until she has
acquired the skills she would have had had she never been institutionalized."), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 962 (1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming order
requiring state to implement a treatment plan for institutionalized person, including placing
him in the community, where the professionals at the hospital to which he was institutionalized
"recommended treatment includ[ing] transfer from the hospital to a group home in the
community"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986), and cert. denied 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
138 See, e.g., Clark, 794 F.2d at 83 ("Having stipulated that their own professional staff
members attributed Clark's present need for supervision to her long institutionalization and
having offered no contrary evidence, the Commonwealth defendants are in no position to
question the trial court's finding that the violations of her rights caused such deterioration of
her ability to cope in society that she needs some form of supervised remediation if she is ever
to be able to do so.").
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Although the right-to-treatment doctrine did promote substantial
deinstitutionalization, the qualms about it were warranted. Because the
right-to-treatment doctrine does not focus on the right to be free from
institutionalization as much as on the right to receive services once
institutionalized, states could theoretically satisfy that doctrine by
improving conditions in institutions without reducing their populations
at all. And in practice, litigation over the right to treatment led many
states to allocate a larger portion of their scarce mental health and
developmental disabilities budgets to institutions. 139 Although there is a
point at which such increased investments become unsustainable,
rigorous enforcement of the right to treatment in institutions can slow
the pace of deinstitutionalization and starve the community services
system for people with disabilities.
Moreover, where the right against treatment was too hostile to the
professionals who provide services to people with disabilities, the right
to treatment was too deferential. The Youngberg "professional judg-
ment" doctrine is the best example of this.140 Though most
deinstitutionalization advocates argue that the Court should have
adopted a more skeptical standard of scrutiny in that case,141 deference
to treating professionals is almost inevitable in a doctrine that is
designed to guarantee individuals the right to professionally appropriate
treatment.
II. CHARTING DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION's FUTURE
As I have shown, the past of deinstitutionalization was marked by
greater success than many commentators have given it credit for. But its
success was certainly limited. And those limitations stemmed directly
from the political dynamics into which deinstitutionalization advocates
inserted themselves and the legal claims on which they relied. In this
Part, I argue that the current wave of deinstitutionalization litigation is
likely to lead to a different pattern of outcomes.
Two key changes help to predict the future of deinstitutionaliza-
tion: first, deinstitutionalization advocates have moved from the
constitutional due process theories on which they relied in the 1970s
and 1980s to a more promising statutory discrimination theory based on
the ADA. Second, deinstitutionalization advocates have essentially won
the old battles for the closing and downsizing of large state institutions
139 See LERMAN, supra note 20, at 173 ("Besides being costly, it is likely that implementing a
judicial policy that includes upgrading can divert scarce resources away from less traditional,
more independent, living arrangements and supportive programs and services.").
140 See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts"- From Deference to Abdication
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
141 See id.
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for people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities. As I
discussed in Part I.A, the population of state institutions for people with
developmental disabilities stands at approximately 16% of its peak, the
population of state and local psychiatric hospitals stands at approxi-
mately 9% of its peak, and these numbers continue to decrease. 142
But the success of deinstitutionalization advocates in moving peo-
ple with psychiatric and developmental disabilities out of large state
institutions has exposed new battlefronts. First, as people have moved
out of large state institutions, large (though typically not as large)
private institutions-private "intermediate care facilities for the
mentally retarded" (ICF/MRs), adult care homes, and nursing homes,
among others-have often taken their place.143 As the locus of institu-
tionalization has shifted to private facilities, deinstitutionalization
advocates have increasingly focused on moving people with psychiatric
and developmental disabilities out of those facilities-a task that has
sharpened their understandings of what truly constitutes integration in
the community. 144 The newfound focus on private nursing homes has
also led advocates to attend to an institutionalized population that had
not especially benefited from the first round of deinstitutionalization-
people with physical disabilities.145 The new reliance on a discrimina-
tion-based theory of litigation fits well with these efforts.
Second, as people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities
have moved out of institutions, the efforts of deinstitutionalization
advocates have necessarily turned toward ensuring that adequate and
appropriate services existed in the community. Concern about the
adequacy of community services became especially acute as the widely-
noted spike in homeless persons with mental illness called the public
legitimacy of the entire deinstitutionalization enterprise into question. 146
And as state budgets moved toward retrenchment following the 2001
and 2007 recessions,147 deinstitutionalization advocates have found
142 See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
143 This trend was apparent by the 1980s. See Gronfein, supra note 94, at 200-02.
144 See, e.g., Williams v. Quinn, No. 05 C 4673, 2010 WL 3021576 (N.D. In. July 27, 2010)
(approving consent decree requiring state to provide supportive housing or other community
living arrangements with supportive services to qualified individuals currently residing in
private "institutions for mental diseases"); State of Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D. Conn. 2010) (challenging
unnecessary institutionalization of people with psychiatric disabilities in private nursing
homes); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(challenging unnecessary institutionalization in private "adult homes"), vacated, 675 F.3d 149
(2d Cir. 2012).
145 See, e.g., Haddad v. Dudek, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (challenging
unnecessary institutionalization of an individual with quadriplegia in a nursing home); Cruz v.
Dudek, No. 10-23048-CIV, 2010 WL 4284955 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010) (challenging inadequate
community services for individuals with spinal cord injuries).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
147 See, e.g., Suzy Khimm, The State Budget Crisis Isn't Over Yet, WASH. POST WONKBLOG
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themselves frequently challenging cuts to the services on which people
with disabilities have relied to thrive in the community.1 48 As with the
increasing focus on private institutions, the reliance on a discrimina-
tion-based litigation theory has assisted deinstitutionalization advocates
in promoting and defending community-based services.
In this Part, I discuss these key changes in the battlefield and chart
their implications for the future of deinstitutionalization litigation.
Section A analyzes the new discrimination-based theories, centered on
the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, on
which deinstitutionalization advocates rely. As I show in Section B,
deinstitutionalization advocates have shifted their demands from rights
to services, and the increasing provision of services in the community
has created an evidence base that has shifted professional practice to a
more community-oriented model. But cracks have emerged in the
alliance between deinstitutionalization advocates and fiscal conserva-
tives. The current era has in some respects intensified the conflicts
between deinstitutionalization advocates and family and union groups,
as both sides see themselves fighting over a shrinking pie in an era of
fiscal retrenchment. But the relentless budget cutting, with its pressure
toward privatization, is a common threat to the family and union
groups and the deinstitutionalization advocates-and it creates at least
the potential for an alliance between the two sides. I also argue that the
new era of deinstitutionalization has led to new conflicts with the
providers of services outside of state institutions. Some of these
providers, like nursing home operators, operate facilities that are clearly
institutions. But others, like local chapters of the Easter Seals, have
thought of themselves as part of the broad coalition of advocates for
deinstitutionalization. This latter dynamic has the potential to lead to
painful internal conflicts within the deinstitutionalization and disability
rights movements.
A. The New Law: Olmstead and Disability Discrimination
The old due process theories continue to be litigated.149 But deinsti-
tutionalization advocates have turned since the 1990 enactment of the
ADA to a distinct theory. That theory is not rooted in involuntary
(Oct. 20, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/the-state-
budget-crisis-isnt-over-yet/2011/1O/20/gIQA35jE1Ljblog.html.
148 See, e.g., Pitts v. Greenstein, Civil Action No. 10-635-JJB-SR, 2011 WL 1897552 (M.D. La.
May 18, 2011) (denying state's motion for summary judgment in challenge to cuts in personal
care services offered in the community); V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(granting preliminary injunction against cuts to in-home supportive services for people with
disabilities).
149 See, e.g., United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2010).
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commitment (as is the right against treatment).1so Nor is it rooted in the
state taking an individual into custody (as is the broader version of the
right to treatment). 151 Rather, it is rooted in a conception of discrimina-
tion that focuses on state resource-allocation decisions. Under this
doctrine, the unnecessary segregation of people with disabilities
constitutes a form of discrimination. The question for litigation is
whether a state's resource allocation decisions promote that unnecessary
segregation.
The key case in the new law of deinstitutionalization is the Su-
preme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.152 In
Olmstead, the Court held that the ADA contains an integration
mandate.13 The case was brought by two Georgia women with
psychiatric and developmental disabilities who had been voluntarily
admitted to a state psychiatric hospital; each woman's treating profes-
sionals believed that she could be served in a community-based
program, but each nonetheless remained institutionalized.154 Address-
ing their claims, the Court held that the ADA's prohibition of
discrimination "require [s] placement of persons with mental disabilities
in community settings rather than institutions" when "the State's
treatment professionals have determined that community placement is
appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive
setting is not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can
be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities."155
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the "integration reg-
ulation," which the Attorney General had promulgated pursuant to his
authority to issue rules implementing the ADA. 156 That regulation
provides that a state must "administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities."157 The Court held that "unjustified
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimi-
nation," because it "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons
so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community
life" and it "severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individu-
als, including family relations, social contacts, work options, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment."158
150 See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
151 See supra note 136.
152 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
153 See id. at 597-603.
154 See id. at 593.
155 Id. at 587.
156 See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 § 204,42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2006).
157 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012).
158 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01.
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The Court did note some limitations on this broad principle,
though. First, the Court said that "the State generally may rely on the
reasonable assessments of its own professionals" in determining
whether an individual is eligible for community-based services.'5 9
Second, the Court noted that there is no "federal requirement that
community-based treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire
it." 160 Finally, a plurality of the Justices concluded that a state can avoid
liability if it can establish a "fundamental alteration" defense that, "in
the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs
would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken
for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons
with mental disabilities."161 The plurality elaborated that a state could
avoid liability if it could "demonstrate that it had a comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a
reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated."162 If a state could make such a showing, the
plurality explained, "a court would have no warrant effectively to order
displacement of persons at the top of the community-based treatment
waiting list by individuals lower down who commenced civil actions."163
Olmstead focuses on a state's resource-allocation decisions in two
ways. First, it attaches the integration duty not just to a state's own
institutionalization of an individual with a disability but more broadly
to a state's "administration" of "services, programs, and activities,"
which may involve services that are paid for by the state but provided
directly by private entities.164 Second, the fundamental alteration
defense looks explicitly to whether immediate relief for the plaintiffs
would be equitable "in the allocation of available resources."165
This focus enables advocates and courts to respond to a broader
array of institutionalization problems than did the due process theories
on which deinstitutionalization advocates formerly relied. The new
doctrine enables challenges to institutionalization in private facilities
(such as nursing homes, adult care homes, and ICF/MRs), for example,
because state funding decisions often are the force driving people with
disabilities into those facilities.166 A state might, for example, pay for
adult diapers for people with disabilities living in nursing homes but not
159 Id. at 602.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
162 Id. at 605-06.
163 Id. at 606.
164 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012); see Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d
289, 316-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
165 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
166 See generally Disability Advocates, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 316-18 (collecting cases).
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for those living in the community,167 it might provide a lower prescrip-
tion drug reimbursement for Medicaid recipients in the community
than for those in nursing homes,168 or it might pay for adult care homes
for people with psychiatric disabilities but not integrated supported
housing, even though the two cost roughly the same.169
Olmstead also enables advocates to obtain high-quality community
services for people with disabilities, precisely because the state's failure
to provide such services will predictably lead many individuals to
become institutionalized, whether in state facilities or private nursing
homes. 170 Recent judgments and consent decrees demonstrate the array
of services courts are willing to require under the Olmstead doctrine. In
the Disability Advocates case, recently vacated by the Second Circuit on
standing grounds (but sure to be refiled), the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York ordered the State of New York to provide
at least 1500 integrated, scattered-site supported housing units per year
to individuals currently residing in private adult homes.171 And the
United States Department of Justice has recently reached Olmstead
settlements with a number of states.172 Those settlements contain
extensive and detailed provisions governing the types of services the
states must provide in the community to those who have been institu-
tionalized or are at risk of institutionalization, the number of individuals
who must receive those services, and timetables specifying when those
services must be provided.
For example, the recent settlement with the Commonwealth of
Virginia provides a detailed schedule according to which the state will
add over 4000 home and community-based waivers for people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities to its Medicaid program over
nine years.173 Just over 800 of these waiver slots will be dedicated to
individuals currently living in state institutions; nearly 3000 will be
167 See Hiltibran v. Levy, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
168 See Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003).
169 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193-223 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
170 See, e.g., Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1182 (holding that individuals who "stand imperiled with
segregation" may bring an Olmstead challenge "without first submitting to institutionaliza-
tion").
171 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2010 WL 786657, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
172 See United States v. Virginia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31 (settling an Olmstead
challenge to unnecessary institutionalization and risk of institutionalization of people with
intellectual or developmental disabilities); Settlement Agreement, United States v. Delaware,
No. 11-CV-591 (D. Del. July 6, 2011) [hereinafter United States v. Delaware Settlement
Agreement] (settling an Olmstead challenge to unnecessary institutionalization and risk of
institutionalization of people with psychiatric disabilities); United States v. Georgia Settlement
Agreement, supra note 31 (settling an Olmstead challenge to unnecessary institutionalization
and risk of institutionalization of people with psychiatric and/or intellectual/developmental
disabilities).
173 See United States v. Virginia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at 4-6.
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dedicated to individuals with intellectual disabilities who currently live
outside of state institutions but who are either on the state's "urgent
waitlist" for a waiver (indicating that they are at substantial risk of
institutionalization) or are children who live in private nursing homes
or intermediate-care facilities; and the remainder will be dedicated to
individuals with other developmental disabilities who are on the state's
waiting list for a waiver or who are children who live in private nursing
homes or intermediate-care facilities.174 The agreement also provides
support for 1000 families who are currently providing for family
members with intellectual and developmental disabilities at home.
These are individuals who might not need all of the services available
under a Medicaid waiver but who do need some supports to prevent
institutionalization.175 The agreement also contains detailed provisions
for a statewide crisis system for people with intellectual and develop-
mental disabilities, so that the response to a behavioral or other crisis is
not institutionalization or criminalization but instead is an intervention
that ensures that the individual can remain successfully in the commu-
nity.176 The agreement also includes a number of provisions to ensure
that "the community" is truly integrated for people receiving services
under it. Those provisions require a commitment to integrated day
activities and supported employment, they put a priority on ensuring
that individuals receive services in their own homes or apartments or
their family's home, and they erect a strong presumption against placing
individuals in group homes containing more than four residents.177 The
agreement also contains significant provisions to ensure that communi-
ty-based services meet key quality measures. 178
The recent Department of Justice Olmstead settlements that in-
volve services for people with psychiatric disabilities take a similar
structure. They contain detailed timetables governing the specific
community-based services specified numbers of people will receive to
ensure that they can leave or avoid admission to institutions. In
psychiatric disability cases, these services generally fall into four key
categories: integrated supported housing;179 intensive community-based
174 See id.
175 See id. at 6.
176 See id. at 7-9.
177 See id. at 9-13.
178 See id. at 20-27.
179 See United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, § IH.1 (requiring the
state to provide 500 new units of scattered-site supported housing for people with psychiatric
disabilities and to provide supported housing to anyone in the target population who needs it
by the end of the agreement); United States v. Georgia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at
18-21 (requiring the state to create 2000 supported housing beds for people with psychiatric
disabilities over five years, and to provide supported housing by the end of the agreement to
any of the 9000 individuals with serious and persistent mental illness in the state who need that
support).
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treatment (like ACT or forms of case management);180 community-
based crisis services;'18 and integrated supported employment.182 Like
the Virginia settlements, the psychiatric disability settlements also
contain extensive provisions ensuring the quality of community-based
services. 183
Crucially, in times of budget retrenchment, the Olmstead doctrine
also enables advocates to challenge cuts to community services, because
those cuts, too, will put people with disabilities at risk of institutionaliza-
tion.184 Olmstead thus offers important tools to avoid the problem of
"dying with their rights on."185 Unlike the due process doctrines,
Olmstead does not incentivize states simply to turn people out of
institutions and onto the streets. It incentivizes states to provide the
180 See United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, §§ II.F-H
(requiring the state by the end of the agreement to have eleven full-fidelity ACT teams, four
Intensive Case Management teams, and twenty-five case managers, all for the agreement's
target population); United States v. Georgia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at 12-15
(requiring the state by the end of the agreement to have twenty-two ACT teams, eight
Community Support Teams, and fourteen Intensive Case Management teams, plus forty-five
Case Management providers, all for the agreement's target population).
181 See United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, §§ I.A-E
(requiring the state by the end of the agreement to create a 24/7 crisis hotline, mobile crisis
teams that can respond anywhere in the state within an hour (plus training of law enforcement
so that police officers know how and when to call on the teams), crisis walk-in centers in the
northern and southern regions of the state, crisis stabilization services, and four crisis
apartments); United States v. Georgia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at 15-18 (requiring
the state by the end of the agreement to create six crisis service centers, three crisis stabilization
programs (not on state hospital grounds), thirty-five crisis beds in non-state community
hospitals, a 24/7 crisis hotline, mobile crisis teams that can respond anywhere in the state
within one hour, and eighteen crisis apartments located in community settings and staffed by
paraprofessionals and peer specialists).
182 See United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, § II.J (requiring the
state by the end of the agreement period to provide integrated, evidence-based supported
employment to 1100 individuals in the target population and to ensure that everyone receiving
ACT services has an employment specialist on his or her ACT team); United States v. Georgia
Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at 21-22 (requiring the state by the end of the agreement
to provide integrated, evidence-based supported employment to 500 individuals with serious
and persistent mental illness).
183 See United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, § V; United States
v. Georgia Settlement Agreement, supra note 31, at 25-26.
184 See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (ordering preliminary injunction
against cuts to personal care services), reh'g en banc denied, M.R. v. Dreyfus, 2012 WL 2218824
(9th Cir. 2012); Pashby v. Cansler, No. 5:11-CV-273-BO, 2011 WL 6130819 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 8,
2011) (granting preliminary injunction against cuts to personal care services); Pitts v.
Greenstein, Civil Action No. 10-635-JJB-SR, 2011 WL 1897552 (M.D. La. May 18, 2011)
(denying state's motion for summary judgment in a challenge to cuts in personal care services);
Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly, 688 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (issuing a preliminary injunction
against cuts to adult day services); V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(issuing a preliminary injunction against cuts to in-home support services).
185 See supra text accompanying note 42. Professor Mark Weber argues that, at least in this
respect, Olmstead guarantees a form of "positive rights." See Mark C. Weber, Home and
Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 269 (2004).
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array of services people need to thrive in the community-at least so
long as a state remains enrolled in Medicaid, which requires states to
pay for nursing home and other institutionalized placements for those
individuals. 186
To be sure, the Olmstead doctrine retains a number of ambiguities
for deinstitutionalization advocates. One such ambiguity is Olmstead's
discussion of the determinations of the state's treating professionals.
The Court said that "the State generally may rely on the reasonable
assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an
individual meets the essential eligibility requirements for habilitation in
a community-based program." 187 Professor Perlin reads this language as
"implicitly endorsing a perpetuation of Youngberg v. Romeo's 'substan-
tial professional judgment' standard."188 To be sure, there does appear to
be a difference between Olmstead and Youngberg on this score:
Olmstead's language of "reasonable assessments" seems to suggest a
negligence standard, which Youngberg rejected in the due process
context as imposing too strict a burden on states. 189 Permitting states to
rely only on "reasonable assessments" of their treating professionals
does appear stricter than requiring "only... that professional judgment
in fact was exercised."190 If courts do broadly defer to the state's own
professionals in Olmstead litigation-or, worse, require a decision from
a state's treating professional before allowing an individual to obtain
relief-then states have a ready means to circumvent the integration
mandate. Professionals who work for the state can simply be directed or
pressured to say that individuals cannot be properly served in commu-
nity settings.'91 A number of lower courts have responded to these
concerns by reading Olmstead as not limiting plaintiffs to relying on the
determinations of the states' professionals. These courts have permitted
plaintiffs to rely on a variety of other sources of evidence-including
their own experts-to show that they can be served in community
settings. 192 But it is unclear how far courts will push the point.
186 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(4) (2006).
187 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
188 PERLIN, supra note 14, at 199.
189 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 313, 321 (1982) (adopting rule articulated by
Chief Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion below, which explicitly rejected a "malpractice"
standard of liability), rev'g, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
190 Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980)).
191 See Long v. Benson, No. 4:08cv26-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 4571904, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14,
2008) ("[T]he Secretary cannot deny the right simply by refusing to acknowledge that the
individual could receive appropriate care in the community. Otherwise the right would, or at
least could, become wholly illusory.").
192 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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A second ambiguity relates to the concept of choice. Olmstead ex-
plains that there is no "federal requirement that community-based
treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire it."193 But relying
on the principle of choice in this context presents two distinct problems.
First, particularly for people with mental disabilities, a large proportion
of the people whose living situation will be determined by Olmstead
litigation have been placed under guardianship. 194 Often these guardians
are family members, but often they are not. Even under recently
reformed guardianship laws, "while some guardians may actively
involve their wards in decisions about their lives, legally, the decisions
are vested in the guardian and are the guardian's to make."195 Much may
depend on whose choice Olmstead is interpreted as implementing: the
choice of the individual with a disability herself, or the choice her
guardian makes on her behalf. 196 Olmstead itself spoke of the choice of
the "patient[],"197 and it relied on regulations that refer to the choice of
the "individual with a disability" 19 -as well as the language in the
preamble to those regulations which states that "persons with disabili-
ties must be provided the option of declining to accept a particular
accommodation."199 These sources would support the argument that it
is the choice of the individual with a disability herself that should
control, but one could argue to the contrary that they should be
interpreted in light of the background state-law principle that guardians
can make decisions for their wards. The courts have not definitively
resolved this question, though a number have suggested that it is the
guardian's choice that matters. 200
Second, where resources are limited it may be impossible to satisfy
the preferences of all individuals with disabilities (or their guardians). If
some want to remain in institutions while others want supports in the
community, the state will have a choice of how to allocate its limited
finds. If enough individuals want to leave institutions and move into the
community, and the state satisfies those preferences, then it might find
193 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999).
194 See, e.g., Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009);
United States v. Arkansas, 794 F. Supp. 2d 935 (E.D. Ark. 2011).
195 Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness-A Legal and Appropriate
Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279, 297 (2011).
196 For a provocative argument that guardianship itself at least presumptively violates
Olmstead, see Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as
a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U.
COLO. L. REv. 157 (2010).
197 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602.
198 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(1) (2012).
199 Id. § 35 app. B (Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability in State and Local Government Services, Originally Published July 26, 1991).
200 See, e.g., People First of Tenn. v. Clover Bottom Developmental Ctr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 701,
713-15 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Ligas v. Maram, No. 05 C 4331, 2010 WL 1418583 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7,
2010).
[Vol. 34:1
2012] DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION LITIGATION 39
continuing to operate the institutions for those who want to remain (or
whose guardians want them to remain) too costly.201 The Olmstead
plurality's discussion of the fundamental alteration defense recognizes
this tradeoff but does not make clear how it should be resolved.202 The
tradeoff has led to intense conflict over Olmstead settlements between,
on the one hand, the plaintiffs (who want to leave institutions) and the
state (which wants to provide them with community services), and, on
the other hand, intervening guardians who want to retain the option of
institutional placement for their wards.203 Given that the ADA creates a
presumption in favor of integration in the community, one wonders
why people with disabilities who want to and can live in the community
should be forced to wait to ensure that other people with disabilities
retain the option of living in an institution.204
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, Olmstead remains the most
promising doctrinal tool yet for achieving the twin goals of deinstitu-
tionalization advocates: enabling people with disabilities to move out of
institutional settings and promoting high-quality community services.
Given the experience of the first wave of deinstitutionalization litigation,
though, the important question is how Olmstead litigation will interact
201 See infra text accompanying notes 227-228.
202 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1415, 1448 (2007) (criticizing post-Olmstead law as "muddled" on this point); David
Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 775-76
(2010) ("Devoid of mention of compliance or enforcement, the Olmstead plan has such scant
required content that it has been characterized as a 'get out of jail free" card for states
otherwise in violation of the decision's integration mandate."' (quoting John F. Muller,
Comment, Olmstead v. L.C. and the Voluntary Cessation Doctrine: Toward a More Holistic
Analysis of the "Effectively Working Plan," 118 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014 (2009))); Susan Stefan, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law: Issues for the Twenty-First Century, 10
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131, 153 (1999) ("Depending on how the lower courts interpret the
requirement of a comprehensive, effectively working plan and a reasonable pace of placements,
this requirement could be either sensible or fatal to any kind of progress in placement of
inappropriately institutionalized people into the community." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
203 See, e.g., Ligas, 2010 WL 1418583 (granting intervention in a case brought by individuals
who wished to move to community settings and institutional residents (appearing through their
parents and guardians) who wished to stay in institutional settings); Benjamin v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 267 F.R.D. 456 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (denying intervention in a case brought by individuals
who wished to move to community settings and institutional residents (appearing through their
parents and guardians) who wished to stay in institutional settings), affd, 432 Fed. Appx. 94
(3d Cir. 2011); see also Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (intervening parents and
guardians relied on Olmstead in seeking to reopen a pre-Olmstead case to seek an order barring
the state from closing an institution for people with developmental disabilities). For a
discussion of the parents-intervenors' position in cases like this, with particular emphasis on
Ricci, see Schwartz, supra note 135, at 862-65.
204 See Schwartz, supra note 135, at 865-66 ("[Tlhe integration mandate is a one-way street.
The state is not required to provide institutional care even if none of the three Olmstead
placement criteria is met. By its specific terms, the integration mandate requires movement
from more to less restrictive settings, not the reverse." (footnotes omitted)).
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with broader political dynamics. I turn to that question in the next
Section.
B. The New Politics: Dangers and Opportunities
At the same time that deinstitutionalization advocates have a pow-
erful new doctrinal tool for accomplishing their goals, the politics of the
field have shifted substantially. As I show in this Section, the political
shifts offer the potential to alleviate some of the conflicts that limited the
success of deinstitutionalization advocacy in the 1970s and 1980s. But at
the same time, they are likely to lead to new conflicts, which will impose
new limitations.
1. The Shifting Valence of Budget Politics
The politics of fiscal retrenchment have, if anything, even more
currency now than they did in the 1970s and 1980s.205 One might,
therefore, expect advocates to be in an especially good position to
pursue further deinstitutionalization efforts now. And it is true that, in
those states that continue to keep large numbers of people with mental
disabilities in public institutions, fiscal concerns remain a powerful force
for shifting the locus of services outside of those institutions.206 But as
those large state institutions have closed and downsized substantially,
and advocates have increasingly focused on the creation of high-quality,
ever-more integrated services in the community, fiscal concerns have
become more of an obstacle to their efforts.
Through the actions and experimentation of forward-thinking psy-
chologists and psychiatrists, and through the implementation of
deinstitutionalization decrees, a set of models has emerged for the
successful provision of services to people with psychiatric and develop-
mental disabilities in the community. These models include methods of
providing housing. In the 1970s and 1980s, the prevalent service models
provided housing largely through group homes and adult foster
205 See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT:
EXAMINING FISCAL 2009-2011 STATE SPENDING 2 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/
sites/default/files/2010%2OState%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf ("State expenditures have been
severely impacted by the national recession and downturn that began in December 2007. The
economic downturn created a unique and in some ways unprecedented fiscal situation for
states.").
206 See, e.g., Quinn Defends Plan to De-Institutionalize Mentally Ill, Disabled, CBS CHICAGO
(Jan. 25, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/01/25/quinn-defends-plan-to-de-
institutionalize-mentally-ill-disabled/ (reporting that Illinois's governor justified deinstitution-
alization efforts on ground that "closing facilities in Jacksonville and Tinley Park, which
together employ about 550 people, would save nearly $20 million").
[Vol. 34:1
2012] DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION LITIGATION 41
homes-if not board and care homes and nursing homes.207 Over the
years, however, advocates and providers have shifted, particularly in the
psychiatric disability context, toward supportive housing-in which a
person with a disability lives alone or with a roommate in a normal
apartment, often paid for with a voucher, while receiving services that
are often provided by someone other than the entity that owns or
operates the housing.208
207 See, e.g., ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 109 (noting that the Willowbrook
plaintiffs sought to place residents "in group homes and foster families"); Arlene S. Kanter, A
Home of One's Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination
Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 932 (1994) ("Group homes and
other congregate living facilities have been viewed as the best alternative to institutionaliza-
tion." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten:
The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 273, 284 (1992) (noting that elderly residents of psychiatric hospitals in
particular were often "released to live in substandard board and care homes, foster homes,
[and] nursing homes").
208 See Marilyn Kresky-Wolff, Mary Jo Larson, Robert W. O'Brien & Sarah A. McGraw,
Supportive Housing Approaches in the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homeless-
ness (CICH), 37 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 213 (2010). For a discussion of supportive
housing for people with psychiatric disabilities, see Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs.
Admin., Pathways' Housing First Program, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EVIDENCE-BASED
PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES, http://nrepp.samhsa.gov/ViewIntervention.aspx?id=155 (last
updated June 19, 2012). Supportive housing can also take a less integrated form, one that looks
much like a service-rich group home. See, e.g., Robert Schafer, Supportive Living Environments
for the Developmentally Disabled (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies at Harvard Univ., Working Paper
No. W98-4, 1998), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/supportive-
living-environments-developmentally-disabled (describing one such model from the
developmental disability context). See generally Sam Tsemberis, Housing First: Ending
Homelessness, Promoting Recovery, and Reducing Costs, in HOW TO HOUSE THE HOMELESS 37,
39-47 (Ingrid Gould Ellen & Brendan O'Flaherty eds., 2010) (describing the choice between
Housing First and linear- continuum models of supportive housing); Kresky-Wolff et al., supra,
at 216 (describing the choice between scattered-site and congregate supportive housing). On
the evidence supporting use of integrated, scattered-site supported housing applying a housing-
first model, see Todd P. Gilmer, Ana Stefancic, Susan L. Ettner, Willard G. Manning & Sam
Tsemberis, Effect of Full-Service Partnerships on Homelessness, Use and Costs of Mental Health
Services, and Quality of Life Among Adults with Serious Mental Illness, 67 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 645 (2010); Leyla Gulcur, Sam Tsemberis, Ana Stefancic & Ronni M. Greenwood,
Community Integration of Adults with Psychiatric Disabilities and Histories of Homelessness, 43
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 211 (2007); Deborah K. Padgett, Leyla Gulcur & Sam
Tsemberis, Housing First Services for People Who Are Homeless with Co-Occurring Serious
Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, 16 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 74 (2006); Deborah K.
Padgett, There's No Place Like (A) Home: Ontological Security Among Persons with Serious
Mental Illness in the United States, 64 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1925 (2007); Carole E. Siegel, Judith
Samuels, Dei-In Tang, Ilyssa Berg, Kristine Jones & Kim Hopper, Tenant Outcomes in
Supported Housing and Community Residences in New York City, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 982
(2006); Ana Stefancic & Sam Tsemberis, Housing First for Long-Term Shelter Dwellers with
Psychiatric Disabilities in a Suburban County: A Four-Year Study of Housing Access and
Retention, 28 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 265 (2007); Sam Tsemberis, Leyla Gulcur & Maria
Nakae, Housing First, Consumer Choice, and Harm Reduction for Homeless Individuals with a
Dual Diagnosis, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 651 (2004); Sam Tsemberis & Ronda F. Eisenberg,
Pathways to Housing: Supported Housing for Street-Dwelling Homeless Individuals with
Psychiatric Disabilities, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 487 (2000). But cf. Sandra Newman &
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Effective models of community-based treatment services have also
emerged. These models include ACT for people with psychiatric
disabilities, in which a multimember, multidisciplinary team provides a
client with an array of services that promote recovery and participation
in the life of the community.209 They also include various other models
for service coordination and intensive case management.21o And they
include models for integrated supported employment.211 Crucially, they
include models for crisis services-so that a medical or mental health
crisis does not lead to institutionalization (whether in a civil facility or,
in the case of many people with psychiatric disabilities, a jail) but
instead prompts the provision of additional intensive services to ensure
that the individual client can remain in the community. 212
Over time, an evidence base has developed that has both refined
and demonstrated the superiority of these service models. When
deinstitutionalization lawyers have prosecuted cases and negotiated
Howard Goldman, Housing Policy for Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 37 POL'Y STUD. J. 299,
310 (2009) (finding evidence more ambiguous than the foregoing studies suggest).
209 See Michelle P. Salyers & Gary R. Bond, Innovations and Adaptations of Assertive
Community Treatment, 12 AM. J. PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION 185 (2009). For a discussion of
the evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of Assertive Community Treatment, at least when
implemented with fidelity to the standards of the ACT model, see Craig M. Coldwell & William
S. Bender, The Effectiveness of Assertive Community Treatment for Homeless Populations with
Severe Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (2007); Robert E. Drake &
Patricia E. Deegan, Are Assertive Community Treatment and Recovery Compatible? Commen-
tary on "ACT and Recovery: Integrating Evidence-Based Practice and Recovery Orientation on
Assertive Community Treatment Teams," 44 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 75 (2008);
Anthony D. Mancini, Lorna L. Moser, Rob Whitley, Gregory J. McHugo, Gary R. Bond, Molly
T. Finnerty & Barbara J. Burns, Assertive Community Treatment: Facilitators and Barriers to
Implementation in Routine Mental Health Settings, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 189 (2009); and
Susan D. Phillips, Barbara J. Burns, Elizabeth R. Edgar, Kim T. Mueser, Karen W. Linkins,
Robert A. Rosenheck, Robert E. Drake & Elizabeth C. McDonel Herr, Moving Assertive
Community Treatment into Standard Practice, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 771 (2001).
210 See Helen Killaspy & Alan Rosen, Case Management and Assertive Community
Treatment, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 142 (Graham Thornicroft,
George Szmukler & Kim T. Mueser eds., 2011).
211 See Deborah R. Becker, Gary R. Bond & Robert E. Drake, Individual Placement and
Support: The Evidence-Based Practice of Supported Employment, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 210, at 161; Gary R. Bond, Gregory J. McHugo,
Deborah R. Becker, Charles A. Rapp & Rob Whitley, Fidelity of Supported Employment: Lessons
Learned from the National Evidence-Based Practice Project, 31 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J.
300 (2008).
212 See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COLLABORATIVE, INC., A COMMUNITY-BASED
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS RESPONSE SERVICE: AN INFORMATIONAL AND
INSTRUCTIONAL MONOGRAPH (2005), available at http://www.tacinc.org/downloads/Pubs/
CrisisMonographFinal.pdf; Michael T. Compton, Masuma Bahora, Amy C. Watson & Janet
R. Oliva, A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
Programs, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 47 (2008); Thomas K. Greenfield, Beth C.
Stoneking, Keith Humphreys, Evan Sundby & Jason Bond, A Randomized Trial of a Mental
Health Consumer-Managed Alternative to Civil Commitment for Acute Psychiatric Crisis, 42
AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 135 (2008); Shenyang Guo, David E. Biegel, Jeffrey A. Johnsen &
Hayne Dyches, Assessing the Impact of Community-Based Mobile Crisis Services on Preventing
Hospitalization, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 223 (2001).
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agreements, they have urged states to provide-and courts to require
provision of-these service models. Indeed, as I showed above, many
Olmstead decrees spell out in a great deal of detail what community-
based services states must provide, when, and to how many individu-
als.213 This itself reflects a shift from many earlier deinstitutionalization
decrees, which imposed detailed requirements on the process by which a
state must determine what sorts of treatment an individual needed, but
did not specify how many individuals should receive what particular
treatments. 2 4 The shift responds to the critique that 1970s and 1980s
deinstitutionalization litigation did a better job of protecting people's
right to avoid living in institutions than of creating a robust system of
services in the community. Advocates are now focusing, first and
foremost, on building that system of services.
It is a commonplace in discussions of institutional reform litigation
that such litigation has important effects in redistributing power within
the government agencies being sued.215 Professional and other constitu-
encies within the agencies who embrace a decree's principles or are
given authority or responsibility under a decree gain power and often
displace or eclipse other individuals and groups who had previously
held sway within the institution. That process has been on clear display
in deinstitutionalization litigation.216 In part as a result of the litigation
itself, professional constituencies within state government that support
institutional care and treatment have been significantly displaced by
other professional constituencies who have embraced and fostered the
new community-based models.
Although there remain some exceptions, 217 litigation today seeking
to move people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities from
large state institutions rarely involves the 1970s-typical clash between
legal rights and professional judgment. To the contrary, the official
position of the professional leadership of most states' developmental
disability and mental health agencies is that the overwhelming majority
of people with those disabilities do not need to live in institutions. The
fight in most cases challenging confinement in large state institutions
today is over pace and budgets-how quickly, and at what expense,
people with psychiatric and developmental disabilities can move into
213 See supra text accompanying notes 171-183.
214 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (describing and approving the Pennhurst settlement).
215 See sources cited supra note 58.
216 See, for example, Professor Phillip Cooper's discussion of the Wyatt litigation in PHILLIP
J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL
OFFICIALS 163-200 (1988).
217 For an example of such an exception, see United States v. Arkansas, 794 F. Supp. 2d 935
(E.D. Ark. 2011).
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the community-not over whether the plaintiffs belong in the commu-
nity in the first place.28
The valence of the budget fight highlights an important respect in
which the politics of deinstitutionalization have turned. In the 1970s
and 1980s, fiscal conservatives often allied with deinstitutionalization
advocates, because moving people out of institutions led to quick and
significant budget savings. 219 But as deinstitutionalization advocates
shifted their goals from rights to services, the cost gap between institu-
tional and community services narrowed. Although studies of
deinstitutionalization have found that people who move from institu-
tions to the community can achieve better outcomes at lower cost, 22 0 it
is reasonable to expect that the cost gap will shrink as people in the
community receive more services. This may be especially true because a
significant part of the cost gap reflects differences in the wages paid to
workers in institutional and community settings22-differences, as I
discuss next in Part II.B.2, that states will face increasing pressures to
narrow. And where people with disabilities live in their families' homes,
another part of the cost gap often simply reflects a shifting of costs onto
family members-a shifting that may be unsustainable, as well.222 Once
private settings such as nursing homes and group homes are thought of
as institutions-an important development I discuss in the Part II.B.2-
the cost gap can narrow further or even in some cases reverse. Where
these settings provide very few services and supports, and they serve a
population that requires significant supports, providing adequate,
integrated services in the community could end up being more
expensive than continuing to provide services in those private settings.
In many cases, these private settings will remain more expensive than
truly integrated settings, however. 223
218 See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 620-22 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2005); Benjamin v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
768 F. Supp. 2d 747, 755 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
219 See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
220 See, e.g., Stancliffe et al., supra note 85.
221 See id. at 295.
222 See Darrell R. Lewis & David R. Johnson, Costs of Family Care for Individuals with
Intellectual Disabilities, in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra note 85, at 63.
223 See, e.g., Haddad v. Arnold, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ("Defendants
admit that, '[i]n most cases, when a Medicaid recipient is diverted or transitioned from a
nursing facility to an [in-home services] waiver program, costs to Medicaid for providing care
to that individual are reduced.' Indeed, for budgeting purposes, Defendants assume a two-to-
one savings for those diverted from nursing homes." (alterations in the original) (citation
omitted)); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 282-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding that, although the housing costs for adult homes are cheaper than those for supported
housing, Medicaid costs are unnecessarily inflated in adult home settings (perhaps because of
the adult homes' profit motive), and the higher Medicaid costs in adult homes more than offset
any savings in housing costs), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Moreover, even where further deinstitutionalization will lead to
significant cost savings, it will not necessarily do so right away. The
creation of a sufficient community service infrastructure can entail
significant start-up costs. The costs are typically not, as many assume,
those involved in constructing housing.224 If scattered-site apartments
are used, in most cases the state need simply provide assistance in
locating an apartment, bridge funding to facilitate the transition into the
apartment and to cover expenses until the individual begins to receive
SSI, and then a voucher to help pay for the housing going forward.225
But the state still will, at least for people with psychiatric and/or
developmental disabilities, have to construct a system of crisis services,
as well as to hire professionals and teams to provide intensive, commu-
nity-based treatment and case management. And as institutional
populations go down, the per-resident costs of institutions rise substan-
tially-largely because of fixed costs that states cannot shed until they
have moved a sufficient number of individuals to close a wing, a floor,
or an entire facility.226 Those who look only at the immediate fiscal
bottom line, therefore, will not support further deinstitutionalization
even if, over the medium to long-term, it will save money.
2. The Intensified Conflict, but Potential for Alliances,
with Families and Unions
As the process of deinstitutionalization has ground on, conflict
between deinstitutionalization advocates and family and union groups
has intensified. The reason is simple economics. State-run institutions
have very high fixed costs of operation. As people leave those institu-
tions and are not replaced with new people coming in, per-resident
costs rise significantly and compare less and less favorably to the costs of
serving current residents in the community.227 Once an institution's
population drops below a tipping point, closure of the entire institution
224 See, e.g., Schafer, supra note 208, at 6. Schafer assumes a single-family home modified to
become an accessible congregate facility with up to fifteen residents.
225 Of course, to the extent that the individuals receiving services require particular physical
accessibility features, that may limit the number of available apartments or require certain
physical modifications to them, which will raise costs. But it generally will not require
purchasing or developing new properties.
226 See Stancliffe et al., supra note 85, at 294-95.
227 See id. at 295-302; see also Roger J. Stancliffe & K. Charlie Lakin, Context and Issues in
Research on Expenditures and Outcomes of Community Supports, in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra note 85, at 1, 5
("In 2002, per diems in public institutions averaged $344.51 (i.e., $125,746 annually) as
compared to raw per diems of $270 in 1997, $211 in 1992, and $90 in 1982. This substantial
growth in per diems was driven, in part, by diseconomies of reduced scale associated with
institutional downsizing."). Using the Consumer Price Index as a benchmark, $90 in 1982
dollars was the equivalent of just under $167 in 2002 dollars.
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becomes almost a fiscal necessity. To parents and family members who
want their loved ones to remain in an institution, and to unions who
want to preserve their jobs in an institution, it becomes equally
imperative to keep the institution from reaching that tipping point-or,
if it has already reached that point, to apply extraordinary political and
legal pressure to delay or forestall what seems fiscally inevitable. In the
new politics of deinstitutionalization, then, parents and unions can be
expected to wage epic battles to keep states and courts from downsizing
institutions-even if the downsizing efforts focus entirely on people
who affirmatively want (and whose families affirmatively want them) to
live in the community. In a time of fiscal retrenchment, as those who
support and oppose deinstitutionalization are fighting over shares of a
shrinking pie, the battles become ever so much more intense.
This intensified conflict has played out in deinstitutionalization
litigation across the country. Parents' organizations have often inter-
vened (sometimes successfully) to oppose agreements that would merely
allow people who choose to receive services in the community to leave
institutions.228 In a number of these cases, such as the original settle-
ment of the Ligas litigation in Illinois,229 these settlements would not
require an individual to leave an institution if she (or her guardian) did
not want to leave. But the parents' organizations quite understandably
feared that, if too many people were allowed to leave the institutions in
question, the choice of keeping one's child in that institution would
soon be unavailable as a practical matter. As I discussed above, the
rhetoric of choice is incomplete in the context of competing claims on
scarce resources.
Similar dynamics have arisen when states have proposed to close
institutions outside of the context of litigation. When Massachusetts
responded to fiscal concerns by seeking to close Fernald Developmental
Center, its oldest institution for people with developmental disabili-
ties-even though it offered residents and guardians a choice of
transferring to another state institution-Fernald parents sought to
reopen a long-closed pre-Olmstead case that had been settled in 1993.230
The parents argued that the closure actually violated Olmstead, because
it deprived them of the opportunity to oppose placement in the
community.23' The district court seemed to express support for this
argument: it restored the case to its active docket; required the Com-
monwealth to "carefully assess the needs and wishes of each resident,
228 See cases cited supra note 203.
229 See Ligas v. Maram, No. 05 C 4331, 2010 WL 1418583, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2010)
(describing the court's decertification of the plaintiff class in response to guardians' objections
to the initial consent decree).
230 These events are well recounted in Schwartz, supra note 135, at 864.
231 Id.
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and provide a genuine and meaningful opportunity for their guardians
to participate in their placement decisions" before closing the institu-
tion; and stated that its ruling "simply ensur[ed]" that the
Commonwealth determine whether each individual's new placement "is
appropriate and whether it 'is not opposed by the affected individual"'
under Olmstead.232 The First Circuit reversed on the ground that there
was no basis for reopening the old decree; the appellate court cited
Olmstead for the proposition that the law had in fact "moved in -a
direction disfavoring institutionalization of residents" since the decree
was first entered.233
But the battle did not end there. Evidently blaming the Massachu-
setts government's decision on the pressures caused by the threat of
litigation, Representative Barney Frank, who represented the district in
which Fernald was located, responded by introducing legislation that
would limit the ability of federally funded Protection and Advocacy
agencies-the source of much Olmstead litigation-to bring cases that
could lead to the closing and downsizing of institutions. 234 Both VOR
and AFSCME have vocally supported this legislation.235 Though the
legislation has not moved in Congress, the support by one of its most
stereotypically liberal members for a bill that would limit public interest
lawsuits highlights the unusual political alliances that continue to
surround deinstitutionalization litigation.
Despite the intensified conflict, the new politics of
deinstitutionalization open up the possibility for alliances between
parent and union groups and deinstitutionalization advocates. In a
meta-analysis of studies of parental attitudes published in 1991, the
researchers Sheryl Larson and K. Charlie Lakin found that "prior
satisfaction with institutional care and reservations about community
care in time turns into satisfaction with community settings for the
majority of families."236 These systematic findings have been replicated
in the studies of implementation of particular deinstitutionalization
232 Ricci v. Okin, 499 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92, 92 n.16 (D. Mass. 2007) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Olmstead), rev'd sub nom. Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 1907 (2009).
233 Ricci v. Patrick, 544 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009).
234 See H.R. 2032, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1255, 111th Cong. (2009).
235 See Press Release, VOR, Widespread Support for H.R. 2032: More than 100 Local, State
and National Organizations Support Legislation to Protect the Rights of Individuals with
Profound Intellectual Disabilities (June 13, 2011), available at http://www.vor.net/images/
Signonletter.pdf.
236 Sheryl A. Larson & K. Charlie Lakin, Parent Attitudes About Residential Placement Before
and After Deinstitutionalization: A Research Synthesis, 16 J. ASS'N FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE
HANDICAPS 25, 36 (1991). Interestingly, when parents are asked after their adult children move
to the community about what their attitudes toward institutionalization and deinstitutionaliza-
tion were before the move, they report a much lower level of satisfaction with
institutionalization-and a much higher opinion of the prospect of moving to the communi-
ty-than they did at the time. See id.
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decrees. These studies concluded that many parents initially opposed
deinstitutionalization because they believed that their children could not
benefit from community services but ultimately found that their
children flourished in the community.237 These parents have often
become vigorous advocates of deinstitutionalization.
Nor have all unions followed AFSCME's lead in opposing deinsti-
tutionalization. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), for
example, filed an amicus brief supporting Massachusetts's decision to
close Fernald,238 and it and its locals have served as plaintiffs in a
number of Olmstead cases. 239 Not coincidentally, it is the SEIU that has
had the greatest success in organizing the dispersed workers who
provide community-based services.240 Advocates of deinstitutionaliza-
tion can build on this alliance with an important and dynamic part of
the labor movement.
In the longer term, it is the politics of fiscal retrenchment itself that
could promote an alliance between deinstitutionalization advocates and
parent and union groups. As states pay less for community-based
services, they will make it difficult for people with disabilities to attract a
stable, skilled workforce of personal assistants, which is something
deinstitutionalization advocates should care about.241 At the same time,
they will pay workers less, which is something unions should care
about.242 And they will shift more costs onto families who are carrying
the load of serving their family members with disabilities, which is
something parent and family groups should care about.243 As the recent
budget cut cases show, there are limits to the use of cost savings as a
justification for deinstitutionalization-and when those limits are
reached, deinstitutionalization advocates share significant interests with
workers and families.244
The overwhelming majority of people with disabilities are no long-
er served in large state institutions, and, as a practical matter, they never
237 See, e.g., JAMES W. CONROY, SEVEN YEARS LATER: A SATISFACTION SURVEY OF THE
FAMILIES OF THE FORMER RESIDENTS OF HISSOM MEMORIAL CENTER 17 (1999), available at
http://www.outcomeanalysis.com/DL/pubs/okr9.pdf (finding a "drastic change in family
attitudes" to the degree that nearly all embraced deinstitutionalization after it happened,
although many were initially skeptical or opposed); JAMES W. CONROY, JEFFREY X. SEIDERS &
ANITA YUSKAUSKAS, PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY PLACEMENT IV: THE FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT
ON THE OUTCOMES OF IMPLEMENTING THE COFFELT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1-2 (1998)
("[F]amilies of the Movers are very highly satisfied with community living, have sharply
reduced their initial skepticism and resistance, and only a handful would ever even think of
seeing their relatives return to a Developmental Center.").
238 See Ricci, 544 F.3d at 11 n.1.
239 See, e.g., M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2011).
240 See Rhee & Zabin, supra note 86, at 972-73.
241 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 80 (2004).
242 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
244 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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again will be. These trends predate and are to a large extent independent
of the current wave of deinstitutionalization litigation. But what that
wave of litigation can do is ensure that, when large state institutions
close, there are adequate and appropriate community-based services for
people who would formerly have been housed there. The sooner
deinstitutionalization advocates, parent organizations, and employee
groups recognize that fact-and that it means they share far more
interests than disagreements-the better will be the position in which
they all will be in fighting the politics of fiscal retrenchment. The
question is whether they will recognize that fact in time to fight
effectively for a continued social investment in services and supports for
people with disabilities.
3. The Increasing Conflict with Service Providers
Providers of community-based services were supportive of efforts
to move people with disabilities out of large state institutions, though
they were not a powerful force in the early days. But as deinstitutionali-
zation progressed, they became an important constituency to whom
government officials were required to listen.245 And, increasingly, they
have come into conflict with advocates of deinstitutionalization.
This conflict arises primarily from a sharpened focus among advo-
cates on what counts as an "institution." When advocates targeted large
state facilities, it was easy for most involved to assume that the goal was
smaller and/or private facilities-that those facilities were the "commu-
nity," not "institutions." But as people with disabilities left the large state
facilities, many ended up in large private facilities: ICF/MRs, adult care
homes, and private nursing homes. These facilities had many of the
characteristics of the institutions advocates had earlier attacked: large-
group congregate living, separate from the broader community; denials
of choice over day-to-day activities; an attitude and policy of paternal-
ism and protection. 246 Many of these facilities, too, were operated by for-
profit providers.247 Deinstitutionalization advocacy-in courts,
legislatures, and the streets-has increasingly labeled these facilities
"institutions" and sought to move people out of them.248
245 See LERMAN, supra note 20, at 12.
246 The district court's findings in the Disability Advocates case are exemplary on this point.
See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 198-218 (E.D.N.Y. 2009),
vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
247 See LERMAN, supra note 20, at 12 ("The move from the state-sponsored institutions is,
therefore, primarily a tilting toward the profit sector of the economy.").
248 For the cases, see cases cited supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text. Professor
Lerman predicted this development as early as 1982. See LERMAN, supra note 20, at 11 ("As the
level of acceptable social-control practices is scrutinized further, many recent alternatives to
traditional institutions may well be deemed new candidates for [deinstitutionalization].").
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The challenges to private institutions created a new set of powerful
enemies for the deinstitutionalization movement. Private, for-profit
operators of nursing homes and adult care homes, in particular, are
extraordinarily powerful within state legislatures.249 To the extent that
effective deinstitutionalization requires reallocation of Medicaid
resources out of institutional settings and to community settings, those
powerful interests will fight with substantial success. Perhaps that is
why, although cases challenging institutionalization in large state
facilities have often been resolved through settlement,250 cases challeng-
ing institutionalization in these private facilities have typically been
resolved only after hard-fought litigation.251
The increasing conflicts with private ICF/MR, nursing home, and
adult care home operators merely broaden the field of battle for
deinstitutionalization advocates; they do not fundamentally change it.
But other developments raise the prospect that advocates of deinstitu-
tionalization will turn against each other. In part, again, this prospect
results from an evolution among some advocates in their understanding
of what constitutes an institution. In the first wave of deinstitutionaliza-
tion, people who left large state facilities typically moved to group
homes and other, relatively small, congregate facilities.252 But many
advocates have come to see ten, eight, and even four-bed group homes
as having characteristics that are uncomfortably similar to those of the
institutions they have attacked.253 These advocates have promoted
decree provisions that require people coming out of institutions to be
served in scattered-site apartments.254 Those provisions directly threaten
the operational model of group home providers-providers who
249 For a classic discussion, see BRUCE C. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME
TRAGEDY 192-201 (1980).
250 See supra text accompanying notes 172-183.
251 See supra text accompanying note 171.
252 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
253 See, e.g., Kanter, A Home of One's Own, supra note 207, at 932 ("[Group homes and other
congregate arrangements] are often simply an extension of the institutions left behind. Group
homes, halfway houses, quarterway houses, and board and care homes are hardly 'homes' at all.
Like institutions, they segregate people with disabilities and confine them with little, if any,
attention to individual choice. The residents of such homes are seldom asked where or with
whom they want to live." (footnotes omitted)).
254 See, e.g., United States v. Delaware Settlement Agreement, supra note 172, §§ II.E.2.d-e
("All new housing created under this agreement will be scattered site supported housing, with
no more than 20% of the units in any building to be occupied by individuals with a disability
known to the State.... All new housing created under this agreement will have no more than
two people in a given apartment, with a private bedroom for each person."); Settlement
Agreement at 6, Williams v. Quinn, No. 05 C 4673 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2010) ("[Permanent
Supportive Housing] includes scattered-site housing as well as apartments clustered in a single
building, but no more than 25% of the units in one building with more than four (4) units may
be used to serve PSH clients known to have Mental Illness. For buildings with two (2) to four
(4) units, no more than 50% of the units may be used to serve PSH clients known to have
Mental Illness.").
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typically understand their jobs as working to free people with disabilities
from institutions.
These tensions are likely to become even more acute as deinstitu-
tionalization advocates move from a focus on where people with
disabilities live to a focus on how people with disabilities live. That shift
has already begun, as advocates-in determining what constitutes an
institution-have looked to whether individuals in a particular setting
have choice, autonomy, and the ability to live lives like everyone else.255
Deinstitutionalization advocates have also begun to challenge not just
segregated housing but also segregated employment for people with
disabilities, such as employment offered through sheltered work-
shops.256 But many of the entities that operate sheltered workshops-
including chapters of the Arc and the Easter Seals-have historically
been strong supporters of deinstitutionalization and remain a key part
of the broader disability rights movement. The expansion of deinstitu-
tionalization principles to challenge these work settings is increasing the
likelihood of internecine battles within the movement.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have shown that the past of deinstitutionalization litigation
was, in key respects, far more successful than most observers
acknowledge. The limits of that success were very real, though: although
deinstitutionalization advocates succeeded in closing the front doors of
large state institutions so that few new people with developmental or
psychiatric disabilities came in, and in opening the back doors of those
institutions so that the vast majority of long-term residents moved out,
they were less successful in building a comprehensive system of
adequate and appropriate services in the community. That key failure
stemmed, I have argued, from two factors: limitations in the legal-
doctrinal tools on which deinstitutionalization advocates relied; and a
political alignment that created pressures to close institutions without
building the community-based services that would be necessary to
replace them.
As we seek to predict the future of deinstitutionalization litigation,
the crucial point is that both of these factors have changed. Deinstitu-
tionalization advocates can now rely on a legal-doctrinal tool-the
Olmstead doctrine-that provides a meaningful way to ensure that
255 Again, the analysis in Disability Advocates is exemplary. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v.
Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 198-218 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
256 See, e.g., Class Action Allegation Complaint, Lane v. Kitzhaber, No. CV12-138 ST, 2012
WL 246537 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2012) (challenging, as a violation of Olmstead, state employment
services system that unduly relies on segregated sheltered workshops).
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states will build and maintain a comprehensive and adequate communi-
ty system. And the very fact that most states have already substantially
closed and downsized their large institutions means that, in those states,
fiscal pressures no longer serve the interests of deinstitutionalization
advocates as well as they did in the past. Today's state fiscal crisis is in
fact moving states to cut back on the (already insufficient) community-
based services that they created as they closed their institutions. This
development might foreshadow a rapprochement between deinstitu-
tionalization advocates and their opponents among parent and union
groups-if all of these players can come to understand their common
interest in time. But it remains an open question whether deinstitution-
alization advocates can succeed in the political arena as their support
from fiscal conservatives predictably wanes.
